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THE PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
JENS MEIERHENRICH*
The tragedy of the world is that those who are imaginative have but slight experience,
and those who are experienced have feeble imaginations. Fools act on
imagination
1
without knowledge, and pedants act on knowledge without imagination.
Alfred North Whitehead
Out of the conjunction of activities and men around the law-jobs there arise the crafts
of law, and so the craftsmen. Advocacy, counseling, judging, law-making,
administering—these are the major grouping of the law-crafts. . . . At the present
juncture, the fresh study of these 2crafts and of the manner of their best doing is one of
the major needs of jurisprudence.
Karl Llewellyn

I
INTRODUCTION
The academic literature on the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been
burgeoning for the past fifteen years, since the delegates of 160 states and
scores of nongovernmental organizations assembled at the so-called Rome
Conference in 1998. In the decade since the establishment of the ICC, in 2003,
at its current Voorburg site in The Hague, an equally important set of writings
has added to the already-tremendous burden facing any researcher seeking to
comprehend the workings of international criminal law. As a consequence of
the gradually expanding role of the ICC in international politics, a steadily
growing number of filings and decisions, including the first judgment, has begun
to coalesce into a jurisprudential library that only the most ardent observers
stand any chance of ever mastering in all of its technical and substantive
complexity. Whereas most scholars are liable to ensnare themselves in the maze
of practice, most practitioners are prone to lose track of the latest contributions
to scholarship. The developing intellectual risk, to borrow from Alfred North
Whitehead, is that most of those who are theoretically imaginative about the
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ICC have but slight experience, and most of those who are experienced with its
operation have but feeble theoretical imaginations.
In an effort to ward off the twin dangers of “imagination without
knowledge” and “knowledge without imagination” in the study of international
law, I provide theoretical tools designed to enable the advanced study of
practices of international criminal law. By identifying empirically—and
analyzing theoretically—a whole array of such everyday practices of the ICC,
the symposium issue this article frames is designed to bring the logic of
practices to the forefront of knowledge production in the study of international
3
law. It is geared toward building an intellectual foundation on which scholars
and practitioners can deliberate more fruitful ways of engaging each other’s
very different lifeworlds than currently exist.
By taking practices seriously in the study of international law, I seek to
accomplish three objectives. First, I hope to draw attention to the fact that the
ICC, like most other international courts, is not a black box. Although this
insight is hardly revolutionary, the bulk of existing scholarship in International
Law (IL) and International Relations (IR) alike has failed, in assessments of
the effectiveness of the permanent international court, to factor in the causal
and constitutive significance of institutional and organizational facets of
4
bureaucratic life, whether they manifest themselves formally or informally. To
be sure, I am not suggesting that the international politics of adjudication play
no role in the determination of judicial outcomes in the international system. In
the case of the ICC in particular, the preferences and strategies of states—and
also of nonstate actors—have had a considerable effect on the initiation, nature,
funding, progression, and outcomes of international legal efforts addressed
toward the punishment of international crimes. From the UN Security Council
to the Assembly of States Parties to the informal group of diplomats known as
“friends of the court,” governmental representatives have exercised power—
sometimes successfully, sometimes not—over the operation of the ICC during
5
the first decade of its operation. The complementarity regime governing the
operation of the ICC further underscores the considerable leverage of states in

3. On the current state of International Law and International Relations scholarship more
generally, see INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
4. For a recent and important IL perspective that glosses over the significance of social practices
inside international courts, see, for example, Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International
Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J.INT’L L. 225 (2013). Suggestive of the neglect in IR is
GOVERNANCE, ORDER, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN REALPOLITIK AND
A COSMOPOLITAN COURT (Steven C. Roach ed., 2009), in which analyses of macrodynamics stand in
for theoretically driven and empirically grounded analyses of the microdynamics of international
justice. The practice approach is one way of helping to address this unfortunate imbalance in the study
of the ICC by scholars of IR, where—rather problematically—desk research continues to be seen as an
adequate substitute for in-depth field research.
5. On role(s) of power in the international system, see, for example, POWER IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
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the pursuit of international justice.
And yet it would be analytically shortsighted to ignore the inner workings of
international courts. As the contributors to this issue make clear, what goes on
inside the ICC is of immediate relevance for making sense of the development
and outcomes of international adjudication. I suggest that international courts
such as the ICC can be profitably studied as both bureaucracies with varying
degrees of autonomy—and occasionally even power—and agents controlled by
7
principals, specifically the States Parties. Seeing that the latter perspective has
8
dominated the study of international courts, I make a case for a
complementary approach, namely one that places the agent in the foreground
of the analysis, and places the principals directing the agent in the background.
Once at the center of the analysis, the agency of international courts requires
9
careful unpacking. Whether from the vantage point of practice theory or
6. For a comprehensive analysis, see the two-volume study THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El
Zeidy eds., 2011).
7. For this argument, made in the context of international organizations more generally, see
IVER B. NEUMANN & OLE JACOB SENDING, GOVERNING THE POLITY: PRACTICE, MENTALITY,
RATIONALITY 137 (2010).
8. Exemplary of the principal–agent approach to the study of international courts are Manfred
Elsig & Mark Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment
at the World Trade Organization, EUR. J. INT’L REL. (forthcoming), available at http://ejt.sagepub.com/
content/early/2012/09/05/1354066112448201; Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the
European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171 (1995); Geoffrey Garrett, Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The
European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52
INT’L ORG. 149 (1998); Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification—The Agency
Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333 (2002); and Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial
Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669 (2007). A
collection of applications to international organizations more generally can be found in DELEGATION
AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L.
Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006). For a discussion and critique of this approach’s dominance,
see Karen Alter, Agent or Trustees?: International Courts in their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L
REL. 33 (2008); and Karen Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Winter 2008).
9. I use “practice theory” in this article interchangeably with “practice-based reasoning,”
“practice-based approach,” “practice thinking,” and related terms. Although the term practice theory
has wide currency in social theory, it is, in many respects, a misnomer because no unified theoretical
perspective exists—or is even desired by those who have adopted this general approach to studying
social life—in the social sciences. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that practice theorists are not
interested in developing theories as conventionally understood in positivist social science, that is, as
testable propositions that explain classes of events in the pursuit of generalization. Rather, the
theoretical purview of virtually all practice theorists extends to all kinds of abstract endeavors, whether
they are short-range, mid-range, or long-range in nature. As one scholar writes,
A theory is of the practice variety . . . when it either (1) proffers a general and abstract
account of practices, either the field of practice or some subdomain thereof, or (2) refers
whatever it offers a general and abstract account of to the field of practices. . . . Systems of
generalization (or universal statements) that back explanations, predictions, and research
strategies are theories. But so, too, for example, are typologies of social phenomena; models
of social affairs; accounts of what social things (e.g., practices, institutions) are; conceptual
frameworks developed expressly for depicting sociality; and descriptions of social life—so
long as they are couched in general, abstract terms.
Theodore R. Schatzki, Introduction: Practice Theory, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY

1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE)

4

3/19/2014 11:29 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:1

otherwise, the contributors to this issue engage in such an unpacking,
collectively attempting to disaggregate the first permanent international
criminal court by scrutinizing various socially meaningful or otherwise
significant aspects of its everyday life. When considered in conjunction, these
analytic narratives enable us to paint a more nuanced picture than currently
exists of one of the most innovative—and contested—international
organizations ever created.
Second, and more broadly, I seek to chart a path in-between objectivism
and subjectivism when it comes to making sense of the practice of international
law. All too often, accounts of international organizations veer toward one or
the other of these analytical extremes. As Matthew Eagleton-Pierce rightly
points out,
[O]jectivist accounts, such as those produced in the rational actor tradition, often
project images of agents engaged in purposeful calculation when it may be more
accurate to define their behaviours as experimental or non-intentional. At the same
time, purely subjective accounts also have problems, such as often over-emphasising
10
the individual as a category of analysis to the expense of groups and structures.

Likewise the study of the ICC is hampered by an artificial divide between
IR and IL accounts of the international organization’s operation. More often
than not, IR accounts are objectivist in the sense just described. Whether
explicitly or implicitly, the preferences of collective agents (for example, the
ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor, or judges) are taken as a given (that is,
exogenous) rather than as the product of institutional dynamics (that is,
11
endogenous) and thus not separable from them. IL accounts, by contrast, are
often so preoccupied with the technical minutiae of prosecution and
adjudication in The Hague that the structured contingency of individual action
12
is not noticed, let alone studied.
Third, I am hoping to inspire an interpretive turn in the study of practices in
international law. On the foundation of my own ethnographic work on the ICC,
THEORY 3–4 (Theodore R. Schatzki et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Schatzki, Introduction: Practice
Theory]. My conception of the nature of “analytic narratives”—the term I choose to classify the
empirical analyses collected in this issue—is grounded in this understanding of what constitutes
theoretical work in the social sciences. Consequently, my conception of the term departs rather
fundamentally from the narrow definition pioneered by Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi,
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast in their coauthored volume ANALYTIC NARRATIVES
(1998). I will return to this methodological issue in part VI below.
10. Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Examining the Case for Reflexivity in International Relations:
Insights from Bourdieu, 1 J. CRITICAL GLOBALISATION STUD. 111, 112 (2009).
11. See, e.g., DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A
WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (forthcoming 2014); STEVEN C. ROACH, POLITICIZING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE CONVERGENCE OF POLITICS, ETHICS, AND LAW (2006).
For a very similar approach, though adopted by a lawyer, see BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF
LAW (2004).
12. See, e.g., CONOR MCCARTHY, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2012); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (4th ed. 2011); THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY:
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 6.
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and inspired by Bourdieu’s indefatigable commitment to ground-level empirical
research on social practices in nonlegal domains, I am keen to alter the ratio of
field research to desk research in the study of international law, in which both IL
and IR scholars have arguably been rather too content with observing
international adjudication from afar, with predictable consequences for the
depth and subtlety of resultant observations.
The remainder of the article is organized into six parts. In part II, I consider
the significance of practice theory for the study of international law. I make a
case for a practice turn in IL by situating the methodological approach in the
context of alternative approaches for the analysis of international legal
phenomena. In part III, I set out the conceptual parameters for the study of
practices in international law. I introduce key attributes regularly associated
with practice-based reasoning in the social sciences. I offer an initial, simplifying
account of what practices are and how they work. With this theoretical baseline
in place, I advance a working definition of social practices that is usable for the
study of international law. In part IV, I take a step back and introduce more
complexity. I present an overview of noteworthy advances in classic and
contemporary practice theory in order to accomplish two goals: first, to show
that practice-based reasoning has a long pedigree such that it ultimately
cannot—and therefore should not—be reduced to one integrated account of
what practices are and how they work and, second, to showcase the
considerably diverse intellectual oeuvre that is available for adoption and
reconfiguration by entrepreneurial IL and IR scholars intrigued to think more
theoretically about the many visible—and hidden—practices that constitute
international law. In part V I demonstrate the significance of studying practices,
as defined in part III, with particular reference to empirical scholarship from IR
and IL respectively. In a first step, I use the example of the macrophenomenon
of diplomacy to illustrate the importance of taking the logic of practices as
seriously as other logics of social action. I then complement the discussion,
again by way of example, with IL scholarship on the practice of legality (which
is representative of an international practice) in the international system and on
the practice of human rights at the World Bank (which is representative of what
I call an organizational practice). Against the background of this necessarily
abbreviated reading of the existing literature, I use part VI to advance
methodological guidelines for the study of practices in international law. With
specific reference to the broad universe of practices pertaining to the operation
of the ICC, I delineate concrete strategies of inquiry. I illustrate the utility of
these methodological guidelines by drawing selectively on the contributions to
this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. The international legal practices
that I will discuss encompass both international practices and organizational
practices, and thus exemplify the application of practice theory at both the
micro- and macrolevel of social analysis. I conclude in part VII, and consider
implications for the practice of international law.
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II
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRACTICES
The dearth of institutionalist scholarship on the ICC, which I bemoan in this
article, is not altogether surprising. For neither graduate school nor law school,
with a few notable exceptions, prepare Ph.D. or J.D. students for what
13
international courts are really like. In IL, a variant of what social scientists
would call “old institutionalism” continues to hold sway. Its prevalence vitiates
against the kind of analytically sophisticated empirical scholarship that is
lacking in, but that would immeasurably advance, the study of international law,
and in particular the study of its practice. The vast majority of courses in law
schools on international criminal law (ICL), to the extent that they are more
than mere survey classes, are doctrine-driven and jurisprudence-heavy. By and
large, this is a good thing, because a deep familiarity with the tangible, everyday
products of international law is a sine qua non of both leading IL scholarship
and practice—although most IR scholars strain to appreciate this.
This doctrinal and jurisprudential immersion often comes, however, at the
expense of a more holistic and more rigorous study of international law,
especially of ICL. There, little attention has thus far been paid to questions of
institutional design, institutional development, and institutional effects, that is,
analytical questions around which a considerable chunk of scholarship in the
social sciences, and especially in political science, has revolved in the past thirty
years, whether in the subfields of American politics, comparative politics, or
14
IR. I put it thus, several years ago, in a review of William Schabas’s important
yet rather conventional volume on adjudication in ICL, The UN International
Criminal Tribunals:
International legal scholarship is ignoring, at it own peril, the significance of
qualitative research for the study of international criminal courts and tribunals. It is
crucial to appreciate in this context that the kinds of ideographic reasoning at which
the social sciences excel are qualitatively different from—and more sophisticated
than—the descriptive (although often technically compelling) accounts of
international legal institutions, processes, and outcomes typically produced by
international lawyers. This is so because international legal scholarship continues to be
dominated, in the words of Jack Goldsmith
and Eric Posner, by an improbable
15
combination of doctrinalism and idealism.

To combat both doctrinalism and idealism, a turn to practice theory may be
useful. For the vast majority of international legal scholarship is reminiscent of
the old institutionalism in law and the social sciences. That approach (now
virtually extinct in the social sciences) consisted primarily of detailed
13. The same holds true for countries in which the study of law is an undergraduate degree.
14. For an overview of the breadth and sophistication of this research agenda, see, for example,
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder & Bert
A. Rockman eds., 2008).
15. Jens Meierhenrich, Book Review, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 696, 699 (2008); see also JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that
international law matters but that it is considerably less powerful and less significant than the majority
of scholars and practitioners believe).
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configurative studies of different institutional (administrative, legal, and
political) structures. “This work,” according to Kathleen Thelen and Sven
Steinmo, “was often deeply normative, and the little comparative ‘analysis’ then
existing largely entailed the juxtaposed descriptions of different institutional
configurations in different countries, comparing and contrasting. This approach
did not encourage the development of intermediate-level categories and
concepts that would facilitate truly comparative research and advance
16
explanatory theory.”
In the early 1980s, this approach, which grew out of the public-law tradition,
was beginning to give way to a “new institutionalism,” first in economics
(pioneered by Nobel Laureate Douglass North), then in sociology and political
17
science. In contrast to the behavioralism of the 1960s and 1970s, when
institutions were viewed as epiphenomenal, that is, as not more than the sum of
individual-level properties, this new institutionalist movement was built around
a series of interlocking ideas:
The ideas deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an
interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions; they
deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes and efficient histories in favor of
relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency; they deemphasize metaphors
of choice and allocative outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality
18
of meaning and symbolic action.

What is the significance of any of this for the study of international criminal
courts and tribunals? Let me make the connections clear. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), to name but a few, are organizations (just like the U.S. Treasury, firms,
or rebel movements). Thus, they can be studied as such. The very same
questions about institutional design, choice, and development that we have
deemed worthy of investigation in the domestic context (and in the context of
such supranational organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
19
(NATO) or the European Union ) can be profitably explored in The Hague,
16. Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (Sven
Steinmo et al. eds., 1992); see also Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The
New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 909–10 (1996)
(evaluating analytical advances of, and similarities between, the sociology of law and the sociology of
organizations).
17. Overviews of these trends are contained in PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY,
INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004); MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN
ECONOMICS: THE OLD AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (1994) and THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
18. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in
Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984).
19. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIALIZATION IN EUROPE (Jeffrey T.
Checkel ed., 2007); JOSEPH JUPILLE, PROCEDURAL POLITICS: ISSUES, INFLUENCE, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004); WALLACE J. THIES, WHY NATO
ENDURES (2009); Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War, 50 INT’L ORG. 445
(1996).

1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE)

8

3/19/2014 11:29 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:1

Arusha, and Freetown. The next generation of international legal scholars
studying international criminal courts and tribunals must “decenter” these
international organizations—that is, they must analyze the multiple ways in
which the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, or any other such institution is produced,
reproduced, and reconfigured as a result of the particular and contingent
beliefs, preferences, and strategies of the individuals (as well as collectivities)
acting within them as well as upon them.
In IR, by contrast, old institutionalism was banished in the early 1980s,
when it also began to disappear in other subfields of political science as well as
in the disciplines of economics and sociology. Yet the relative neglect of the
inner workings of international courts in general and of the ICC in particular is
surprising nevertheless, especially because IR scholars in other contexts
20
successfully disaggregated the bureaucracies of international organizations.
These important advances notwithstanding, still largely missing from the
empirical turn in international legal scholarship are treatments of international
courts as bureaucracies. More specifically lacking are studies that focus, to
21
invoke Karl Llewellyn, on the “law-crafts” of international law. The focus on
everyday practices of the ICC that I promote in this article is one of several
ways of deepening—and broadening—the empirical turn in international legal
scholarship. It is noteworthy because it can be used to foreground aspects of
international law not commonly subjected to analytic scrutiny. I begin this
article from the premise that a considerable portion of what international
lawyers and other actors contributing to the making of international criminal
law do is not the result of conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection.
Rather, I assume, with Vincent Pouliot, that “practices are the result of
inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear ‘selfevident’ or commonsensical. This is the logic of practicality, a fundamental
22
feature of social life that is often overlooked by social scientists.”
This omission is particularly glaring in the domain of international law.
Despite a veritable cottage industry of quantitative scholarship on the
determinants and effects of international law emanating from the social
sciences, the majority of scholars, most of whom are inexorably embedded in
the knowledge structures of IR, have shown a considerable disregard for the
really existing worlds of international law. In addition to the “widespread
20. A notable exception is BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (2008), though this treatment is not theoretically motivated or otherwise driven by a
progressive social ontology. Having said that, it contains numerous interesting observations that
suggest the author is cognizant of the importance of (also) scaling down in order to make sense of the
ICC.
21. On the notion of the “social lives” of international justice, see PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Marie-Bénédicte Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., 2007).
See also Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 999
(2006) (examining the contributions of anthropological and ethnographic research to understanding the
development and sources of international law).
22. Vincent Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities, 62
INT’L ORG. 257, 258 (2008) [hereinafter Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality].
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ignorance of legal theory and epistemology among political science and IR
23
scholars,” recently diagnosed by Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack, most social
scientists betray a very weak understanding of how international law really
works. By opening the black box of the ICC, which most IR scholars (and also
many IL scholars) continue to treat as if it were an undifferentiated whole, the
contributors to this issue seek to help close the considerable methodological
gap that still divides the disciplinary approaches of IR and IL scholarship. This
is more necessary than ever, for, if we believe Dunoff and Pollack, the muchtouted rapprochement between the two disciplinary subfields that Kenneth
Abbott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others envisaged has not been as
harmonious as many had hoped it would be when it commenced some twenty
years ago:
On the IR side, caricature and ignorance of international legal scholarship is, if
anything, more widespread. It appears that many political scientists are concerned that
legal scholarship is overtly normative and fails to generate predictive, testable
hypotheses; is highly formalistic, overly technical, and inaccessible to those who lack
legal training; and ignores issues of fundamental interest to IR24scholars, such as the
role of power asymmetries in producing international outcomes.

Dunoff and Pollack might have added that many IR scholars also hold an
outdated view of contemporary international law as practice. For in addition to
regularly downplaying the explanatory significance of IL approaches to the
study of international law, IR scholars have but a scant understanding of what
international legal practitioners actually do on a daily basis. Unlike most
scholars of comparative politics who have an intimate understanding of their
research sites, IR scholars of international law have tended to stay well clear of
fieldwork. Analysts who study international legal actors, institutions,
organizations, and processes on the ground—where things are considerably
more complex than they appear from a few thousand miles away—are rare. As
a result, many IR scholars have a very simplistic sense of what makes
international law hang together. International legal goings-on are regularly
reduced to factors that can be reflectively isolated. By this I mean that the vast
majority of IR scholars gloss over explanatory factors that cannot be objectively
25
studied.

23. INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 3, at 11.
24. Id. at 13. Among the first calls for interdisciplinary collaboration between international and
the social sciences (with a particular focus on IR) was Kenneth Abbott’s 1989 article, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989).
For an early symposium on the beginnings of a rapprochement, see THE METHODS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004). The contributions
previously appeared in the pages of the American Journal of International Law. Symposium on Method
in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999).
25. For a recent and influential example, see BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). For a foundational collection of articles, see
also Special Issue, Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT.’L ORG 385, reprinted in LEGALIZATION
AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter
eds., 2003).
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In recent years, Yves Dezalay and a number of largely Europe-based
scholars from across law and the social sciences have begun to pay theoretical
26
attention to the practice of international law. Unfortunately, the bulk of this
27
scholarship has been centered on the process of legal integration in Europe. It
remains for the general approach of Dezalay and others to make inroads in the
study of ICL. In this article I make a foray into this unchartered terrain.
III
THE LOGIC OF PRACTICES
“Practice theory”—by which I mean the entire universe of perspectives that
have sought, since the late 1970s, to incorporate practice-based reasoning into
social theory, and more recently into legal theory—defies easy articulation.
Though the term practice theory is widely used, it would be more accurate to
speak of practice theories, in the plural. For one is hard-pressed to extract from
the many contending perspectives on the nature and logic of practices easily
comprehensible tenets that all of the scholars who have contributed to
theorizing the phenomenon would readily accept, although I will attempt to do
so nonetheless. I begin by taking a brief look at the intellectual juncture at
which practice theory—at least in its contemporary variant—emerged, and in
response to which rival strands of thought. Doing so is useful in order to
appreciate what is at stake in adopting—or rejecting—a focus on practices in
international law.
In the social sciences, theorists like Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and
Marshall Sahlins, in particular, responded to the intellectual supremacy of what
28
Sherry Ortner has usefully described as “theories of ‘constraint.’” Most
influential among these theories of constraint were interpretive (or symbolic)
anthropology (invented by Clifford Geertz), Marxist political economy
29
(advocated by Eric Wolf), and French structuralism (by Claude Lévi-Strauss).
Within anthropology in the 1970s, the advocates of these divergent intellectual
responses to the previously widespread dogma of functionalism all espoused the
ontological priority of structures over agents. This is to say, they all believed
that the behavior of individuals and collectivities is ultimately reducible to the
26. See, e.g., Yves Dezalay, Les courtiers de l’international: Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de
l’impérialisme et missionnaires de l’universel, ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES
[ARSS], Mar. 2004, at 5 (Fr.) (exploring the ways in which international professional elites—experts,
consultants, and so on—have invented, promoted, engineered, and otherwise shaped various facets of
globalization); Guillaume Sacriste & Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International Law: Lawyers’
Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 83 (2007) (tracing the
multiple and often antagonistic roles of international lawyers in the interwar years).
27. Representative publications are EUROPEAN WAYS OF LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Volkmar Gessner & David Nelken eds., 2007); LAWYERING EUROPE:
EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD (Antoine Vauchez & Bruno de Witte eds.,
2013).
28. Sherry B. Ortner, Updating Practice Theory, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY:
CULTURE, POWER, AND THE ACTING SUBJECT 1, 1 (Sherry B. Ortner ed., 2006).
29. Id.
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manifold social structures—from kinship to families to bureaucracies to beliefs
to world systems—in which agents are embedded. Ortner puts it thus:
Human behavior was shaped, molded, ordered, and defined by external social and
cultural forces and formations: by culture, by mental structures, by capitalism. . . . But
a purely constraint-based theory, without attention to either human agency or to the
processes that produce and reproduce those constraints—social practices—was
30
coming to seem increasingly problematic.

In sociology, Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, and others, drawing on
ideas of Max Weber, George Mead, and Herbert Blumer, introduced what
became known as “symbolic interactionism” and (subsequently)
“ethnomethodology” into the debate in order to counter what they considered
31
the excessive influence of structuralism in social theory. Putting agents front
and center, the advocates of these relatively marginal approaches were
preoccupied with the microdynamics of social interaction. By erring on the side
of agents, these advocates often let structures fall entirely by the wayside. The
result was a methodological individualism that was as inadequate in capturing
social complexity as the methodological structuralism that symbolic
32
interactionism had sought to replace. It is this intellectual logjam that practice
33
theorists (as they later came to be known) set out to break.
Although there is considerable variation among practice-based theories,
what unites all practice theorists, self-declared and otherwise, are two important
intellectual commitments, as perceptively identified by David Stern: first, a
commitment to “holism about meaning” and, second, an “emphasis on the
importance of close attention to particular practices and the context within
34
which they are located.” At the inception of practice theory, three particular
works were marshaled in support of the discipline’s twin commitments.
Together the works encapsulated much of practice-based theorizing in the
1970s. Two of them were sociological, the third anthropological, in disciplinary
orientation. Arguably the most important was Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory
of Practice, followed by Giddens’s Central Problems of Social Theory and
35
Sahlins’s Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities. Each in its own way,
these works
set out to conceptualize the articulations between the practices of social actors ‘on the
ground’ and the big ‘structures’ and ‘systems’ that both constrain those practices and
yet are ultimately susceptible to being transformed by them. They accomplished this
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
See id.
Id.
David G. Stern, The Practical Turn, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 185 (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003).
35. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977) [hereinafter BOURDIEU,
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE]; ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL
THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979); MARSHALL
SAHLINS, HISTORICAL METAPHORS AND MYTHICAL REALITIES: STRUCTURE IN THE EARLY
HISTORY OF THE SANDWICH ISLANDS KINGDOM (1981). For a brief discussion of the first two books
and their relation to practice theory, see infra Parts IV.B.4, IV.C.1.
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by arguing, in different ways, for the dialectical, rather than oppositional relationship
between the structural constraints of society and culture on the one hand and the
‘practices’—the new term was important—of social actors on the other. They argued
as well that ‘objectivist’ perspectives (like Wolf’s political economy) and ‘subjectivist’
perspectives (like Geertz’s interpretive anthropology) were not opposed ways of doing
social science but represented ‘moments’ in a larger project of attempting to
36
understand the dialectics of social life.

By offering a promising way to transcend the so-called agent–structure problem
in social theory—that is, the long-standing, unresolved question of whether
agents or structures are ontologically prior when it comes to explaining the
social world around us—Bourdieu, Giddens, Sahlins, and the practice-oriented
scholarship they inspired “restored the actor to the social process without losing
37
sight of the larger structures that constrain (but also enable) social action.”
Against this background, it is no wonder that practice theory is gradually
finding adherents among IR and (though more rarely) IL scholars. Largely
inspired by Alexander Wendt’s seminal 1987 article on the agent–structure
38
problem in the study of international politics, IR theorists in the 1990s spilled
much ink on questions of epistemology and ontology and the relation of each to
39
explanation and understanding in their field of study. Because empirical
scholarship on questions related to the constitution (to borrow Giddens’s term)
of international phenomena is now more common (and sophisticated) than
twenty years ago, the grounded approach first advocated by practice theorists
for making sense of domestic goings-on is increasingly being adapted for the
study of the international system. In IR, this tendency is illustrated, most
recently, by work on so-called international practices such as diplomacy and
40
deterrence. The introduction of practice theory into IL can be traced back to
Yves Dezalay, whose work on international commercial arbitration and related
international phenomena, often undertaken in collaboration with Bryant Garth,
has, for the last twenty years, endeavored to inspire a similar “practice turn” in
41
the study of foreign, comparative, and international law. More recently,
36. Ortner, supra note 28, at 2 (internal citation omitted).
37. Id. at 3.
38. Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, 41 INT’L.
ORG. 335 (1987).
39. For an influential collection, see INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND (Steve
Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski eds., 1996). See also MARTIN HOLLIS & STEVE SMITH,
EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1991). For the most sophisticated
and coherent restatement of conventional IR theory at the time, see ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
40. For more detailed accounts of these studies and other IR scholarship employing the tools of
practice theory, see infra Part V. For an overview, see INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES (Emanuel Adler &
Vincent Pouliot eds., 2011).
41. Representative of their practice-oriented scholarship are their three award-winning books,
namely YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW
OF EMPIRE (2010); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION A N D T H E C O N S T R U C T I O N O F A T R A N S N AT I O N A L L E G A L
O R D E R ( 1 9 9 6 ) [ h e r e i n a f t e r D E Z A L A Y & G A R T H , D E A L I N G I N V I R T U E ] ; YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002).
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Antoine Vauchez and others have taken up the Bourdieusian mantle and
contributed to spreading practice-based scholarship on international legal
phenomena, with particular reference to the legal integration of the European
42
Union and related developments. Entirely missing from this fledgling IL trend,
however, is the study of ICL, where practice theory has made no discernable
inroads. But before I turn to ICL, I will elaborate on the essentials of practice
theory and then reconstruct its genealogy—all for the purpose of providing the
intellectual building blocks for the sophisticated, and diverse, study of practices
in international law.
A. What Are Practices?
The nature of practices, like that of most categories of analysis, is contested.
Alternative conceptions abound. Notwithstanding this richness in conceptual
imagination, the essence of practices is stable across the multitude of existing
definitions as almost all conceptions of practices, and the theories constructed
around them,
foreground the importance of activity, performance, and work in the creation and
perpetuation of all aspects of social life. Practice approaches are fundamentally
processual and tend to see the world as an ongoing routinized and recurrent
accomplishment. This applies even to the most durable aspect of social life—what
scholars call social structures. Family, authority, institutions, and organizations are all
kept in existence through the recurrent performance of material activities, and to a
43
large extent they only exist as long as those activities are performed.

But what exactly are practices? Consider the following four contending
conceptions from the late twentieth century: Michael Oakeshott’s procedural
conception, Alasdair MacIntyre’s cultural conception, Theodore Schatzki’s
agentic conception, and Pierre Bourdieu’s “sobjectivist” conception. Although
in the present analysis I very deliberately simplify the nature of practices, in
part IV I take a step back and, also very deliberately, introduce uncertainty into
the discussion. Hopefully, this additional layer of complexity will be useful
when I eventually turn, in part VI, to contemplating methodological guidelines
for the study of practices in international law. The variety of theoretical
approaches will serve, in part IV and also in the immediate analysis, as a useful
reminder that there is more than one way of defining—and thus of studying—
the practice of international law.
To begin with, the philosopher Michael Oakeshott as part of advancing his
theory of action referred to a practice as
a set of considerations, manners, uses, observances, customs, standards, canons,
maxims, principles, rules, and offices specifying useful procedures or denoting
obligations or duties which relate to human actions and utterances. It is a prudential
or an authoritative adverbial qualification of choices and performances, more or less

42. For an overview of this decidedly Europe-oriented research agenda, see Antoine Vauchez,
Introduction: Euro-Lawyering, Transnational Social Fields and European Polity-Building, in
LAWYERING EUROPE, supra note 27.
43. DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK, AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION 3
(2013).

1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE)

14

3/19/2014 11:29 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
complicated, in which conduct is understood in terms of a procedure.

[Vol. 76:1
44

As compelling—and recognizable from our everyday lives—as this definition of
a singular practice is, it falls shorts in key respects. Most important, because it is
excessively steeped in methodological individualism, Oakeshott’s take on
practice glosses over the feedback loop—that is, the mutually constitutive
relationship—that usually exists between agents and the structures surrounding
45
them. Notably, he does so by conceptually separating practices from the
actions they are said to govern. As one critic has it,
Oakeshott sunders them because, as a good conservative, he wants the identity of
action to derive solely from features of individuals. This he achieves by tethering what
someone does to his or her understandings and motives. Once, however, the identity
of action is pegged to the individual, practices (i.e., sociality) can only pertain to the
46
how of action.

One remedy adopted by practice theorists has been to make sociality a
defining attribute of practice. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre, also arguing
from philosophy, defines practices as
coherent and complex form[s] of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence,47 and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended.

Unpacking this abstract definition, one is left with three defining attributes that
a form of activity must possess in order to justify calling it a practice on this
account: It must be complex, it has to have internal goods, and it has to be
enacted in the pursuit of standards of certain societal values, such as excellence.
In this same analysis, MacIntyre gives a series of real-world examples to
illustrate his definition:
Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with
skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice;
architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the enquiries of
physics, chemistry
and biology, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting
48
and music.

The definitional requirement of “internal goods” is best illustrated by reference
to one of MacIntyre’s preferred examples: the practice of chess. Internal goods
44. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 55 (1975).
45. The classical statement remains ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY:
OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1986) [hereinafter GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY] (critiquing orthodox social science and calling for a combination of insights from
functionalism and naturalism). For a recent exploration in the context of international politics, see
COLIN WIGHT, AGENTS, STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POLITICS AS ONTOLOGY
(2006) (arguing that epistemological and methodological differences in the study of international
politics are insignificant and that the only differences worth investigating are ontological, that is, they
relate to our understanding of how the world is constituted).
46. THEODORE R. SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TO HUMAN
ACTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL 97 (1996) [hereinafter SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES].
47. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187 (1981).
48. Id.
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are the (more or less) unique products derived from the act of playing chess, for
example, the attainment of particular analytical skills or the ability to reason
strategically, as illustrated by the ability to predict an opponent’s moves.
External goods are products that the practice of chess may well help produce—
49
money, power, fame—but that are not uniquely related to the activity.
For MacIntyre, practices are fairly stable, long-lasting phenomena related to
what he calls “living tradition.” As he writes,
[T]he history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded in
and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition through
which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us; the history of each of our
own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in
50
terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions.

MacIntyre, unlike other theorists who have attempted to capture and define the
nature of practices in our lives, has a rather optimistic outlook. In his moral
philosophy, being part of a tradition (and, by implication, its practices) is an
important ingredient of the good life. As a consequence, practices, for
MacIntyre, tend to be marked by coherence and cooperation. This is an
assumption not shared by all practice theorists—a difference that manifests
itself conceptually. Take, for example, the definition of practice by Theodore
Schatzki, to which I now turn.
For Schatzki, a practice refers to “a temporally evolving, open-ended set of
doings and sayings” constituted and maintained by “practical understandings,
51
rules, teleoaffective structures, and general understandings.” This definition
offers an analytical, rather than normative, take on practices. What is more,
unlike his predecessors, Schatzki, by way of the definitional qualifier “openended,” emphasizes that practices “entail irregularities and unexpected
52
elements.” It follows from this that practices, thus understood, are not an
inherently desirable logic of social action, as the definitional accounts of
Oakeshott and MacIntyre would have us believe. Whether discrete actions
combine to a unified practice in Schatzki’s account is determined solely by the
presence or absence of four mechanisms—“practical understandings, rules,
53
teleoaffective structures, and general understandings.” The worthiness or
meaningfulness or effectiveness of practices is an entirely separate, empirical
question.
Schatzki has made a valuable contribution to specifying the nature of
practices by suggesting that the nexus between doings and sayings is brought
about and shaped by the interplay among understandings, procedures, and
engagements that vary independently from one another depending on context,
49. Id. at 187.
50. Id. at 222.
51. THEODORE R. SCHATZKI, THE SITE OF THE SOCIAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL LIFE AND CHANGE 87 (2002) [hereinafter SCHATZKI, THE SITE OF THE
SOCIAL].
52. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 164.
53. Id. at 165.
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and that determine the kinds of performances that some theorists say are part
and parcel of all forms of “praxis,” by which is meant the world of human action
(in contrast to the world of human reflection). One implication of Schatzki’s
concretization of the nature of practices is that, on his conception, “practices
54
can easily overlap and the same doing can be part of two practices.” This is of
immediate relevance for understanding the practice of international law
because it opens up an analytical space in which multiple interpretations of the
social meaning of legal behavior can coexist. Methodologically, this means that
a practitioner’s interpretation of “doing” in an applied international legal
setting—such as the ICC—could be entirely compatible with an analyst’s
conflicting interpretation of the same “doing.” For example, an explanatory
account that holds a particular adjudicative way of doing things to be
representative of a bureaucratic practice could be as valid as—and entirely
compatible with—an alternative account that points to the same conduct as
55
constituting a stigmatizing practice. It is precisely in this sense, as Davide
Nicolini points out, that “authors operating within this tradition [of practicebased reasoning] insist that practices are not just what people do, and that
adopting a practice approach is distinctly different from simply providing more
56
accurate, or more detailed or ‘thicker’ descriptions of people’s conduct.” To
push this agenda, Schatzki distinguishes between “integrative practices” and
“dispersed practices.” Because the former are easier to understand, let me start
with them.
Schatzki defines integrative practices as “the more complex practices found
in and constitutive of particular domains of social life. Examples are farming
practices, business practices, voting practices, teaching practices, celebration
practices, cooking practices, recreational practices, industrial practices, religious
57
practices, and banking practices.” For the province of social life with which I
am concerned in this article, an example of what Schatzki understands by an
integrative practice is the totality of legal practices in domestic politics and
international affairs. Dispersed practices, on the other hand, refer to “a set of
doings and sayings linked primarily by an understanding they express,”
according to Schatzki, who further notes that “[e]xamples of dispersed practices
are the practices of describing, ordering, following rules, explaining,
58
questioning, reporting, examining, and imagining.” Without going into
technical detail, what Schatzki’s very demanding treatment of the
conceptualization of practices affords us is an analytical toolkit with which to
begin to dissect the social lives of international law. Regardless of whether we
subscribe to his particular theoretical perspective, Schatzki’s definitional efforts
54. Id. at 168.
55. An article on adjudicative practices that was scheduled to appear in this issue was not received
in time for publication. On stigmatizing practices, see Frédéric Mégret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 287.
56. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 168.
57. SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 98.
58. Id. at 91.
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promise to help with demarcating the boundaries of practices that are integral
to the making of international law.
A final author to introduce in this discussion of definitions is Bourdieu,
whose practice theory did not convince Schatzki. Schatzki faulted the French
sociologist for an excessively structural account centered on the concept of
“habitus,” a concept that I specify in part IV when I engage in more detail with
Bourdieu’s influential perspective on the nature and meaning of social
practices. Yet Bourdieu is important to briefly introduce here because his
conception of what practices are has featured so prominently in recent IR
59
theory. Pouliot not long ago came up with the awkward—yet apt—notion of
“sobjectivism” to convey the ontological position taken up by Bourdieu across
60
most of his oeuvre. According to this position, both subjectivism and
61
objectivism are required for making sense of social life. Indeed Bourdieu
deemed them “equally indispensable to a science of the social world that cannot
62
be reduced either to a social phenomenology or to a social physics.” It is for
this reason that, in this preliminary definitional analysis, I speak of Bourdieu’s
as a sobjective conception of practices. What does this conception entail?
Sidestepping for now the dense theoretical substance of Bourdieu’s
treatment, it is worth noting that the French sociologist devoted inordinate
amounts of space to explicating and fine-tuning his concept of habitus, but
neglected almost entirely the careful conceptualization of practices, even
though they feature centrally in several of his most important books. Despite
this conspicuous gap in Bourdieu’s scholarship, we can deduce a definition from
his many more general statements, and from some of his empirical work on the
topic. At one point, Bourdieu speaks of behavior that is “[o]bjectively
‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to
rules” and that is “collectively orchestrated without being the product of the
63
organizing action of a conductor.” In Bourdieu’s language, practices are
sometimes referred to, not much more helpfully, as activities or “games” that
are played in the context of particular “domains of practice,” which he calls
64
“fields.”
Alan Warde has remarked that Bourdieu “does not conceive of a practice as
a coherent entity and is especially intent on emphasizing the importance of
65
praxis.” Linked to this was a strong concern with corporeality, or the bodily

59. For an extended discussion of the Bourdieusian variant of practice theory, see Part V.C.1
below.
60. Vincent Pouliot, “Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 359,
359 (2007).
61. Id.
62. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 25 (1990) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC
OF PRACTICE].
63. Id. at 53.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 174–177.
65. Alan Warde, Consumption and Theories of Practice, 5 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 131, 133
(2005).
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dimensions of practices. This focus, influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
66
Phenomenology of Perception, is more pronounced in Bourdieu’s practice
theory than in some of the others in existence. Yet Bourdieu was less concerned
with capturing the essence of practices definitionally. Arguably, this was owed
to his penchant for inductive reasoning, notably his extensive ethnographic
67
work. It stands to reason that he did not want to exclude ex ante from his
purview human conduct that may not stand up to a well-crafted definition of
practices. Bourdieu may also have been reluctant to advance such a definition
because of his—rather paradoxical in light of his theoretical ambition—
skepticism toward all efforts at explaining and understanding social practices.
As he wrote in The Logic of Practice, “[T]he language of overall resemblance
and uncertain abstraction is . . . too intellectualist to be able to express a logic
that is performed directly in bodily gymnastics, without passing through explicit
68
apprehension of the ‘aspects’ chosen or rejected.” He went on to contemplate
the nature of real-world practices (and the related category of rites), pointing to
the fallacy of seeking to contain in concepts a logic that is made to do without
concepts; of treating practical manipulations and bodily movements as logical
operations; of speaking of analogies and homologies (as one has to in order to
understand and explain) when it 69
is simply a matter of practical transfers of
incorporated, quasi-postural schemes.

What remains is a conception of practice that, though underspecified, opens up
a broader space for empirical exploration than some of the contending
definitions. By highlighting the importance of habitus, and the significance of
corporeal schemas, Bourdieu’s sobjective conception draws our attention to yet
another way of talking about social practices.
What practices are taken to be varies across the numerous theorists who
have discovered them and across the various theories that have been
constructed around them. In this part, I illustrated this theoretical variety and
the considerable difficulty associated with capturing the nature of practices.
This conceptual challenge, however, should not cause us to dismiss the
analytical significance of practices, or to equate practices with mere behavior, as
some critics are wont to do. As Andreas Reckwitz writes, “There is a certain
danger of trivializing practice theory. At first sight, its approach might seem
relatively close to everyday talking about ‘agents’ and their behaviour. In fact,

66. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (1962) (critiquing the
objective thought of Descartes and Kant and arguing, against the “phenomenological reduction” of
Husserl and others, that the body, rather than consciousness, is the most important determinant of
human perception).
67. Aside from southwestern France, Bourdieu’s ethnographic work centered on the Kabyle
region of Algeria. For an account of his motivations, aims, and circumstances for doing fieldwork in
that country, see Pierre Bourdieu, Algerian Landing, 5 ETHNOGRAPHY 415 (2004). More recently, see
also PIERRE BOURDIEU, ALGERIAN SKETCHES (2013). For a critical engagement with Bourideu’s
ethnographic work in Algeria, see Jane E. Goodman, The Proverbial Bourdieu: Habitus and the Politics
of Representation in the Ethnography of Kabylia, 105 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 782 (2003).
68. BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 89.
69. Id. at 92.
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70

this is not the case.” Simply put, practices are “body/knowledge/things71
complexes.” What all definitions of practices have in common is the
conceptual foregrounding of “non-instrumentalist notions of conduct,” as
72
Warde helpfully puts it.
Although theorists who take practices seriously deny that individuals have
active agency, by which I mean the capacity to fully determine their own
behavior, these theorists do not believe in holism either. “As carriers of a
practice,” Reckwitz notes, individuals
are neither autonomous [as rationalists assume] nor the judgmental dopes who
conform to norms [as constructivists tend to argue]: They understand the world and
themselves, and use know-how and motivational knowledge, according to the
particular practice [under investigation]. There is a very precise
place for the
73
“individual”—as distinguished from the agent—in practice theory.

Because, according to Reckwitz, “there are diverse social practices, and as
every agent carries out a multitude of different social practices, the individual is
74
the unique crossing point of practices, of bodily–mental routines.” What this
means is that practice theory retains the idea of agents (unlike, say, textualism
or mentalism), but significantly complexifies this idea, thereby overcoming one
of the major shortcomings associated with methodological individualism,
namely its crude, automaton-like characterization of really existing individuals.
The preceding discussion juxtaposed a number of the more prominent
conceptions of practices currently available. This conceptual variation
notwithstanding, it is possible to tease out commonalities. On the foundation of
my preliminary concept analysis, I take practices to refer to recurrent and
meaningful work activities—social or material—that are performed in a
regularized fashion and which have a bearing, whether large or small, on a social
phenomenon, in our case, on the operation of international law. I suggest that
practices, thus defined, result from the noninstrumental and often spontaneous
interplay of doing, saying, and knowing by groups of individuals. Implicit in my
definition and qualifier is the assumption that “practices are inherently
contingent, materially mediated, and that practice cannot be understood
75
without reference to a specific time, place, and concrete historical context.”
Reckwitz offers further elaboration:
A ‘practice’ (Praktik) is a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several
elements, interconnected to one [an]other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental
activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of
understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge. A
practice—a way of cooking, of consuming, of working, of investigating, of taking care

70. Andreas Reckwitz, Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist
Theorizing, 5 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 243, 250 (2002).
71. Id. at 258.
72. Warde, supra note 65, at 136.
73. Reckwitz, supra note 70, at 256.
74. Id.
75. Davide Nicolini, Zooming In and Out: Studying Practices by Switching Theoretical Lenses and
Trailing Connections, 30 ORG. STUD. 1391, 1394 (2009).
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of oneself or of others, etc.—forms so to speak a ‘block’ whose existence necessarily
depends on the existence and specific interconnectedness
of these elements, and which
76
cannot be reduced to any one of these single elements.

For Reckwitz, studying practices means identifying and interpreting the many
ways “in which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated,
77
things are described and the world is understood.” After all, all of these forms
of behavior combine to make up what most practice theorists understand by
practices.
B. How Do Practices Work?
In the most general sense, practices are “meaning-making, identity-forming,
78
and order-producing.” Because this tripartite distinction captures the logic of
the vast majority of practice-based approaches to social explanation, I adopt it
here to organize this preliminary sketch. I will illustrate its analytical value with
passing reference to international law.
Practices are meaning-making in the sense that they generate and
disseminate knowledge about the social world. By participating in a practice,
individuals become acquainted, for better or worse, with a recurrent pattern of
socially recognized behavior. Such participation can bestow purpose on an
otherwise mundane everyday activity. In the case of international law, the
contribution of an individual to a given practice such as the investigation of
international crimes can go a long way toward validating that individual’s
choice of vocation especially when practices reference the discourses,
representations, and other “symbol systems” that are meaningful in the life of
the individual in question. This is so, as Wilhelm Dilthey, the influential
historian and philosopher observed, because “the parts of a life have a meaning
according to their relation to that life, its values and purposes, and according to
79
the place they occupy in it.”
But practices in international law are meaning-making in a second sense as
well, as Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth have shown in the case of
international commercial arbitration:
Lawyers (assuming that the term even has the same meaning in different countries)
come from very different national legal traditions and from different parts of the
profession (judiciary, academy, [private] practice, government), and they respond to
different clients and constituencies. . . . The abstraction of international law is
therefore closely tied to the activities
of individuals and groups, who thereby give
80
concrete meaning to the abstraction.

This means that individuals engaged in recurrent performances of a legally
relevant practice—such as international commercial arbitration—invariably

76. Reckwitz, supra note 70, at 249–50 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 250.
78. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 7.
79. WILHELM DILTHEY, MEANING IN HISTORY: WILHELM DILTHEY’S THOUGHTS ON HISTORY
AND SOCIETY 148 (1961).
80. DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 41, at 3.
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also give meaning to said practice due to the interests, preferences, norms, and
values that they embody and with which, consciously or otherwise, they infuse
the activities that constitute the practice. Or, as Bourdieu put it in a foreword to
Dezalay’s and Garth’s important study,
The national members of this new international elite, a noblesse de robe, by exercising
their talents in the major transnational entities, humanitarian organizations, or even
great legal multinationals, help to bring juridical forms to a higher level 81of
universalization in and by a confrontation of different and at times opposed visions.

The work of Dezalay and Garth is useful for our purposes because it
powerfully illustrates the utility of reasoning in terms of a logic of practices.
Without delving too deeply into the substance of their rich and nuanced
analysis, we learn a considerable deal about the nature and determinants of
international commercial arbitration because of their focus on “the people who
are recognized as having authority to handle these high-stakes, complicated
82
disputes,” and the multiple conflicts among them. Dezalay and Garth, for
example, find that the kind of international justice that is meted out in the
context of competition for transnational business disputes is, in key respects, a
function of social cleavages that exist within the field of international
commercial arbitration. It appears that the path of socialization that arbitrators
take on their way into the profession, and the kind of legal setting from which
they end up operating, have a considerable effect on the type of arbitration that
they pursue as well as the kind of outcome that we can expect from their
83
involvement.
One major battle line, say Dezalay and Garth, revolves around what they
call “grand old men” and “technocrats.” In the civil-law tradition of continental
Europe, the former cast of arbitrators is comprised of eminent professors and
high-ranking judges, in the Anglo-American common-law world by senior
84
barristers, Queen’s Counsel, and senior partners in U.S.-style law firms. The
technocratic set, by contrast, is less exclusive and more sizable, not to mention
younger. Its emphasis is not on charisma but on technical competence, notably
in the economic analysis of law, as increasingly favored by large international
85
law firms. The emergence of this vocational cleavage about the conduct of
arbitration is not only interesting, it began to complicate the settlement of
business disputes by way of international arbitration. That is at least what
86
Dezalay and Garth found. But other cleavages mattered as well, they noticed.
87
There was the divide between “academics” and “practitioners.” And in a case
study of the International Chamber of Commerce of Paris, for example,
Dezalay and Garth point out additional cleavages that, on their argument, have
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at viii.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33–57.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36–38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 41–42.
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a more than random structuring effect on arbitration outcomes, namely the
difference between those who continue to see arbitration as a mode of guided
settlement (of “auxiliary justice”) and those who have come to see it as just
88
another form of litigation. Dezalay and Garth trace the emergence of these
contending practices of international commercial arbitration to the mergers and
acquisitions of enterprises on the one hand, and to increased anti-trust litigation
on the other. Both trends, they claim, created a demand for a new kind of legal
89
knowledge, “that of specialist in taking charge of conflict situations.” If we
believe Dezalay and Garth, in the administration of disputes, these specialists
“consider judicial recourse not as an end in itself but only as an argument and a
means of pressure. The negotiators consider judicial recourse as one of the
weapons that can be deployed in a conflict that will almost surely end prior to
90
trial.” Dezalay and Garth use this example of the rationalization of arbitration
practices in international law, in conjunction with many others, to account for
the gradual decline of the lex mercatoria, that is, the general principles of
international commerce, as the principal structuring device of international
91
commercial arbitration.
Although the empirical veracity of this conclusion need not concern us here,
it is immediately apparent that the aforementioned findings, and others like it,
were possible only because Dezalay and Garth, drawing on Bourdieu, decided
to take seriously the everyday life of international arbitrators, that is, the
practice of international law. Unlike so many other legal scholars of
international arbitration, they did not assume that practitioners of the law of
dispute settlement were identical to one another or were defining and acting on
the same self-interests in similar ways, and thus not worthy of theoretical or
empirical explication. Instead, they argued, and showed, that it was important
to study arbitrators in context, as structurally mediated individuals. The term is
mine, not theirs, but it serves to relate their take on international commercial
arbitration to the sobjectivist ontology that is germane, as we have seen, to all
theories of practice.
Whatever one makes of the practical significance of Dezalay and Garth’s
findings in the study of international commercial arbitration, it is undeniable
that their methodological approach generated insights that neither the
discipline of IL, nor the profession of international arbitrators, previously
possessed, at least not at the level of systematicity evidenced by Dealing in
Virtue.
By homing in, for the first time, on locally situated examples of legal
contention over the form and function of international dispute settlement, they
were able to substantiate a professional shift in the late twentieth century
“toward more procedurally elaborate and factually based approaches” in the
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 54–57.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 39.
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conduct of international commercial arbitration, thereby providing “a
convincing account of the internal dynamics of this hitherto virtually
92
inaccessible world.” Having said that, inasmuch as Dezalay and Garth’s work
on international commercial arbitration, and more specifically the peculiar
social world of arbitrators that they describe in such rich detail, shows the value
of a practice-oriented approach to international law, a closer, more
ethnographic, exploration of the international legal practices to which they
alerted us, would substantially complement their pioneering approach and
further deepen IL’s understanding of the nature and determinants of the
international arbitration of business disputes. For as one reviewer of the book
observed, admiringly, “This is an unusual and intriguing book . . . because its
authors have embarked upon a study based principally upon the development
of international commercial arbitration and the practice and practitioners of
arbitration without the benefit of any extensive empirical experience of their
93
own upon which to draw.” One can only imagine the kind of fine-grained
contribution about the practices of international commercial arbitration that an
ethnographic immersion might produce.
It is the task of the practice-oriented researcher to unearth all of the
aforementioned aspects of meaning-making, successful and otherwise. Or, to
paraphrase the historian R. G. Collingwood, the object to be discovered in the
study of practices is not the mere activity, but the thought expressed in it. To
94
discover that thought is already to understand a practice’s meaning.
Next, practices are identity-forming in the sense that they regularly shape
the self-understandings—in whatever direction—of individuals who are
engaged in their performance. To return to the example of the international
criminal lawyer, continued exposure to, and participation in, the practices of
international prosecution or international adjudication may result in a moral
identification with the project of international justice (or, alternatively, a
rejection thereof). Importantly, this self-identification can work at both the
individual and collective levels. Familiarity with bureaucratic practices at, say,
the ICC, may foster individual socialization on the part of lawyers and other
practitioners. It may lead to an increased (or decreased) identification with the
values commonly associated with the permanent international court. As David
Koller points out, for example, “At its most ambitious, faith in international
criminal law manifests a hope for a new political reality—both in terms of the
decisions made by policymakers and in terms of an underlying globally shared
95
cosmopolitan identity.” The sustained participation in ICC practices can
92. Ruth Buchanan, Constructing Virtual Justice in the Global Arena, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 363,
364 (1997) (reviewing DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 41).
93. John Beechey, Book Review, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 569, 569 (1997).
94. In the original formulation, “[T]he object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the
thought expressed in it. To discover that thought is already to understand it.” R. G. COLLINGWOOD,
THE IDEA OF HISTORY 214 (1961).
95. David S. Koller, The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1019, 1023 (2008).
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strengthen—or weaken—this faith, with predictable effects for individual
identity formation. But sustained exposure to an international legal way of
96
doing things can also set in motion collective identity formation among states.
Alastair Iain Johnston explored the logic of international socialization in a
97
least likely case, that of China. He found that increasing social interactions in
international security institutions by Beijing’s diplomats in the post-Mao era led
to their becoming more cooperative and willing to self-bind in treaty
98
negotiations over arms control and disarmament. Put differently, the
routinization of legalism (and the practices concretely associated with it) can
leave a mark on a state’s collective identity. I have elsewhere explored the
99
identity-forming consequences of practices of legality in a domestic context.
On the international stage, postwar Germany’s expanding commitment to
international law, which culminated in that country’s important role in the
negotiations over the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
exemplifies, one could say, the identity-forming consequences of practices of
legality in an international context.
Of course, the identity-forming consequences of legal practices will not
always be inclusive. As several critical IL scholars have shown in the last
100
decade, international legal practices also give rise to exclusionary identities.
Consider the principle of extraterritoriality, which formed a pervasive
international practice in the expansion of international society in the nineteenth
century. The classification of countries like China and Japan, to name but two,
as culturally inferior at the time has had long-run consequences for identity
formation in the developing world, leading to what Rogers Brubaker and
Frederick Cooper termed “external identification,” that is, “formalized,
codified, objectified systems of categorization developed by powerful,
101
authoritative institutions.” External identification courtesy of the practice of
extraterritoriality and other imperialist legal practices provoked in some parts
of the developing world a century later what Balakrishnan Rajagopal has
described as “international law from below,” marshaled by agents who defined
themselves in opposition to the prevailing international legal order, and who
derived a part of their collective identities from nineteenth- and twentieth96. See generally Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384 (1994) (arguing that the interaction among states in the international system
can change their identities and interests, which means that both are endogenously derived, not
exogenously given, as contending theories of IR assume).
97. ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS,
1980–2000 (2007).
98. See generally id.
99. JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 1652–2000 (2008).
100. Foundational texts include ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS (Anne Orford
ed., 2006); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
101. Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 1, 15 (2000).
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102

century practices of international law.
Finally, practices are order-producing. Unlike theoretical accounts of order
founded on a commitment to methodological individualism, practice-based
accounts insist that social order is the result of more than the mere interaction
of self-interested agents.
Practice thinkers usually acknowledge the structuring and coordinating import of
agreements, negotiations, and other interactions, as well as the undergirding
significance of skills and interpretations. They treat these phenomena, however, as
features of or as embedded in practices, hence as subject to or as constitutive of the
latter. As a result, interactions, skills, and interpretations determine orders (and are
themselves ordered) qua features of practice. Practice approaches also tend to reduce
the scope and ordering power of reason. They do this by abandoning the traditional
conception of reason as an innate mental faculty and by reconceptualizing it as a
103
practice phenomenon.

On this perspective, practices produce order by facilitating a particular
understanding of the world on the part of those agents who participate in it.
Order comes about per force of the stable reproduction of socially significant
activities. On this account, shared knowledge is an ingredient in the cement of
society, enhanced by way of routinization.
From the direct effects of practices, let me briefly turn to their interaction
effects. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, in a recent attempt to theorize the
logic of international practices, have distinguished among four types of
104
relationships that can obtain between or among individual practices. For the
purpose of this discussion of order-producing effects of practices, I will only
105
touch on the fourth type of relationship, which they call “subordination.”
Under this tightest of constellations, practices are arranged in a hierarchical
manner. Some practices are said to “anchor” other practices by making them
possible. The example that Adler and Pouliot give, and that is of immediate
import for the study of international law, is the practice of sovereignty

102. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 100. Exemplary of the growing literature on nineteenth century
practices are PÄR KRISTOFFER CASSEL, GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND
IMPERIAL POWER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA AND JAPAN (2012) (showing how
extraterritoriality emerged, how its practice evolved in Japan and China, and why both territories were
affected rather differently) and TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA (2010) (theorizing and
exploring in relevant cases the rise and fall of extraterritoriality as an instrument of colonial rule).
103. Schatzki, Introduction: Practice Theory, supra note 9, at 5.
104. They distinguish among “parallel existence,” “symbiosis,” “hybridization,” and
“subordination.” Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot, International Practices: Introduction and
Framework, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 40, at 3, 20–21.
105. Id. at 20. On their argument, parallel existence points to a relationship that is superficial. In
this constellation, “practices are linked in space and/or time but they do not significantly interfere. This
may be because these practices belong to different registers of social life, because they perform unalike
functions, because they make use of unrelated tools, etc.” Id. A symbiotic relationship among practices
exists, next, when “practices remain distinct but they form a coherent whole in which the parts . . . are
united in a mutually reinforcing relationship.” Id. Hybridization, third, describes a constellation in
which interacting practices combine to form an entirely new practice, that is, “[e]lements of different
practices are rearranged into a hybrid new form that replaces past ways of doing.” Id.
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106

anchoring the practice of diplomacy. Theoretically speaking, “[i]n these
hierarchical bundles, one practice may become the dominant form of a set of
107
subordinated practices, which may nonetheless continue to be practiced.”
With further reference to international law, some might say that subordination
has begun to characterize the relationship between the long-standing practice of
juridical statehood and the newer practices associated with the “new
humanitarianism.” If we believe the more optimistic observers of international
politics, the doings and sayings that were observable under the banner of the socalled responsibility to protect (R2P) in particular have inaugurated a new
108
hierarchy of international practices. It is worth reiterating here that practices
require agents to exist in the first place. Absent any agentic input, practices will
have no meaningful effect. As Adler and Pouliot write,
[W]e want to insist that agency is front and center in the interplay of practice, if only
because it is practitioners who, ultimately, are the performers. Put in simple terms, the
reason why a given bundle of practices follows a particular scenario and not others has
less to do with how it fits together—a functional argument—than with how it is fitted
together as a result of political struggles. The politics of practice concern the ways in
which agents struggle to endow certain practices with political validity and
109
legitimacy.

Yet contrary to Adler and Pouliot’s formulation, not every practice follows
the logic of political struggle. Some constellations of practices will form for
reasons other than contentious politics. Adler and Pouliot’s instrumental take
on the logic of practices overlooks the spontaneous emergence of routinized
ways of acting on the social world. International law is full of such spontaneous
practices. This is an important insight in a time when “the politics of
international law” are the preferred point of departure for IR scholars, which
causes them to neglect a large swath of what international lawyers actually do.
Though politics informs a great deal of international law, it does not govern all
of it, and certainly not all of the time. It is this latter slice of reality, located at
the intersection of the political and the mundane, that deserves closer scrutiny
than it has attracted thus far.
In the foregoing, I have provided an overview of the logic of practices as if
there were such a thing as a unified practice theory. Maintaining this fiction was
necessary in order not to get bogged down in the abstract technicalities that
have accompanied the practice turn in contemporary theory.
After these preliminaries, however, a few caveats are in order. Barry Barnes
put them so well that there is no need to paraphrase. In deploying practice
theory, writes Barnes,

106. Id. at 20.
107. Id.
108. On the idea of R2P, see, for example, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF
STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME (Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2011). For a more
sophisticated and critical account, see ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011).
109. Adler & Pouliot, supra note 104.
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it must be recognized that: (a) no simple either/or contrast can be made between
‘theory’ and ‘practice;’ (b) no indefeasible distinction can be made between visible
external practices and invisible, internal states; (c) any attempt to give a satisfactory
description of social life must make reference to much else besides practice; and (d)
110
practice does not account for its own production and reproduction.

Finally, although this article, and the issue that it frames, make a case for a
practice turn in the study of international law, I am nonetheless cognizant of the
limitations, and of the potential dangers, associated with doing so. It is
therefore worth echoing the cautionary note sounded by Jörg Friedrichs and
Friedrich Kratochwil in another effort at theorizing about practically embedded
knowledge. Addressing the recent practice turn in IR, they rightly insist that
this analytical reorientation “should not preclude more conventional research
111
into power, interest, preferences, and so on.” As they put it, “After ‘culture’
and ‘discourse,’ we should beware of ‘practice’ as yet another totalizing
112
ontology that aspires to encompass everything social.” In the same vein, my
argument for more theoretically sophisticated and empirically grounded
scholarship on legal practices in the international system should be understood
as a plea for complementing the methodological toolkit currently available to
IL and IR scholars of international law, not as a clarion call intended to rally
support for supplanting conventional perspectives on international law. My
overriding analytical objective is to make the study of international law more
diverse—not less so. With a preliminary understanding in place of both what
practices are and how they work, we are in a position to delve more deeply into
the theory of practices.
IV
THE THEORY OF PRACTICES
Although the focus on practices as discrete units of analysis is relatively
new, practice-based ontology has a long pedigree. In this part of the article, I
trace the genealogy of practices—and with it the uneven development and
mixed fortunes of practice-oriented reasoning in the humanities and social
sciences—from ancient to postmodern times. This intellectual history, though
necessarily abbreviated, is essential for clarifying what stands to be gained from
relating practical knowledge to scientific knowledge in explanations of
international legal phenomena such as the adjudication of international crimes
at the ICC. Moreover, by exploring the universe of practice-based reasoning
across space and time, we gain a better appreciation of the promise—and
limits—of alternative routes for bringing practices into the study of
international law.

110. Barry Barnes, Practice as Collective Action, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY
THEORY, supra note 9, at 17, 19.
111. Jörg Friedrichs & Friedrich Kratochwil, On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can
Advance International Relations Research and Methodology, 63 INT’L ORG. 701, 713 n.56 (2009).
112. Id.
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My goal in this part of the article is to encourage the pursuit of all kinds of
practice-based research designs by IL and IR scholars, whether they take their
cue from Aristotle’s idea of phronesis, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein,
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, or any other member in the “large family of
113
terms . . . used more or less interchangeably with ‘practices.’” The upshot,
then, is this: In order to truly grasp international law, in the Weberian sense of
achieving an “empathetic understanding” thereof, we have no choice but to
114
enter, as deeply as we can, the webs of significance that practitioners spin.
Being able to choose the methodological and theoretical tools most appropriate
to the twin tasks of immersion and disentanglement, in turn, requires
comprehensive knowledge of practice theory, broadly conceived. Before
turning to the ICC, I will therefore rehearse alternative perspectives for
illuminating the reality of international law, all of which fall under the broader
rubric of practice theory. All of these practice-oriented approaches are in
principle compatible with other theories of social action, yet each would need to
be reconfigured for the study of international law. It is here where the potential
for analytical innovation lies—in the adaptation of highly abstract, and not
infrequently purely philosophical, theories of practice for the empirical study of
international legal phenomena.
A. Ancient Perspectives
What Martha Nussbaum has called “the controlling power of reason”
115
dominated the classical Greek approach to knowledge. A quest for certainty,
and thus universal principles of life, united much classical thought. In the
ancient world, the philosophy of Plato was responsible for establishing a
hierarchy of knowledge. In his writings, notably in The Republic, his famous
Socratic dialogue, he developed a theory of universals that put a premium on a
representational epistemology. It is Plato to whom we owe the widespread
belief in the superiority of scientific knowledge because “Plato effectively cast
practice, materiality, and performativity beyond, or more precisely below, the
116
scope of theory of knowledge.” The assignment of low value to practical
knowledge stemmed from the assumption that “good practice” could only be
117
derived from eternal principles. As a consequence, the willingness of most
Greek philosophers to accord analytical significance to the particularities of life,

113. STEPHEN TURNER, THE
AND PRESUPPOSITIONS 2 (1994).

SOCIAL THEORY OF PRACTICES: TRADITION, TACIT KNOWLEDGE,

114. I am here paraphrasing both Weber, for whom man was an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, as well as Clifford Geertz, who took culture to represent those webs.
What both had in common was an unshakable belief in the necessity of an interpretive rather than
scientific search for meaning. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES:
SELECTED ESSAYS 5 (1973).
115. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (1986).
116. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 25.
117. Id. at 24.
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including its everyday practices, was very limited. After all, only Plato’s
philosopher kings were deemed worthy of governing his utopian city of
118
Kallipolis. One exception proved the rule—Aristotle, who, as it turns out, put
considerably more stock in the value of practical knowledge than his teacher.
Although it is sometimes said that Aristotle, by distinguishing theory and
practice as two distinct epistemic objects, “laid the foundation for the historical
demise of practice in the Western tradition,” a closer reading of his
philosophical oeuvre reveals a thinker who was far more comfortable with
different ways of knowing than Plato, to much of the rest of whose belief system
119
he stayed true. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle established what he
called “praxis” as a separate form of knowledge. For him, praxis was a
120
phenomenon without moral qualifications. At the same time, he thought it
relevant for making sense of life.
Aristotle’s interest in practical knowledge is apparent in his distinction,
developed in the Nicomachean Ethics, among three kinds of knowing: episteme,
phronesis, and techne. Moving beyond Plato, for whom scientific knowledge
(episteme) was the only relevant activity of the human mind, Aristotle thought
practical wisdom (phronesis) and what we might call art or craft or skill (techne)
were also deserving of philosophical reflection. In his philosophy, “[t]he aim of
phronesis is to produce praxis or action informed by knowledgeable valuedriven deliberations; the aim of techne, instrumental rationality, is poiesis, i.e.
121
the creation or production of material or durable artefacts.” Aristotle’s
introduction of praxis as an independent form of knowledge has had a farreaching effect on the philosophy of knowledge. It gave credence to the
argument that theory and practice are incommensurable, that practical
knowledge cannot be reduced to theoretical universals. Practical wisdom on
Aristotle’s account cannot be fully summed up in rules and guides for action
without its essential attribute—contingency—becoming lost in the translation.
As he put it,
It is obvious that practical wisdom is not deductive scientific understanding
(episteme). . . . [P]ractical wisdom is of the ultimate and particular, of which there is no
scientific understanding, but a kind of perception—not, I mean, ordinary senseperception of the proper objects of each sense, but the sort of perception
by which we
122
grasp that a certain figure is composed in a certain way out of triangles.

In other words, Aristotle, like contemporary practice theorists, took
exception to the assumption, as widespread then as now, that all comprehension
of the world was rational and intentional. For Aristotle, as Nussbaum noted,

118. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R. E. Allen trans., 2006).
119. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 23–24.
120. Elizabeth Belfiore, Aristotle’s Concept of Praxis in the Poetics, 79 CLASSICAL J. 110, 110–11
(1983).
121. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 26; see also NIKOLAUS LOBKOWICZ, THEORY AND PRACTICE:
HISTORY OF A CONCEPT FROM ARISTOTLE TO MARX (1967).
122. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, ch. VIII, l. 1142a (Sarah Broadie & Christopher
Rowe eds., Oxford University Press 2002).
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“[p]ractical insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is non-inferential, nondeductive; it is, centrally, the ability to recognize, acknowledge, respond to, pick
123
out certain salient features of a complex situation.” It follows from this that
praxis “cannot even in principle be adequately captured in a system of universal
rules—and hence cannot be the subject of episteme, because it has to do with
124
mutability, indeterminacy, and particulars.” This rendering in the classic
tradition of praxis as a nondeductive and nonrepresentational form of
knowledge had profound consequences for modern perspectives on the nature
and meanings of social practices.
Bent Flyvbjerg, more than anyone, has popularized the idea of phronesis in
the social sciences. Indeed, he has developed, during the last decade or so, a
sustained case for a “phronetic social science,” which recently culminated in the
125
publication of a policy manifesto of sorts. Flyvbjerg’s scholarship, the latest
Aristotelian twist in the so-called practice turn in contemporary social theory, is
an amalgam of insights from Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, Michel
Foucault, Clifford Geertz, and a few other twentieth century thinkers who
displayed an analytical preference for practical over epistemic knowledge in the
study of the social world. “Phronetic research,” Flyvbjerg writes,
focuses on practical activity and practical knowledge in everyday situations. It may
mean, but is certainly not limited to, a focus on known sociological, ethnographic, and
historical phenomena such as “everyday life” and “everyday people.” What it always
means, however, is a focus on the actual daily practices which constitute a given field
of interest, regardless of whether these practices take place on the floor of a stock
126
exchange, a grassroots organization, a hospital, or a local school board.

Or in an international court, for that matter.
At the same time, it is important to note that phronesis, or prudence, in the
original Aristotelian formulation was imbued with a deep ethical imperative.
Phronesis was a virtue to be striven for, part of the recipe for a good life. It was
a moral position, not a methodological one, as it would subsequently become
for Bourdieu and other twentieth-century theorists of practice. As Chris Brown
usefully reminds us,
Aristotle is not a social scientist in any modern sense of the term, even in a sense of
the term that could incorporate Bourdieu; his concern in the Nicomachean Ethics is
with the living of a good life rather than with a desire to understand social
practices. . . . [T]he Aristotelian notion of phronesis is always about 127
the exercise of the
faculty of reason, which is not the case with Bourdieu’s formulation.

123. NUSSBAUM, supra note 115, at 305.
124. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 27.
125. REAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: APPLIED PHRONESIS (Bent Flyvbjerg, Todd Landman & Sanford
Schram eds., 2012).
126. BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER: WHY SOCIAL INQUIRY FAILS AND
HOW IT CAN SUCCEED AGAIN 134 (2001).
127. Chris Brown, The ‘Practice Turn,’ Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards a Phronetic
International Political Theory?, 40 MILLENNIUM 439, 446 (2012).
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B. Modern Perspectives
Modern perspectives are worth contemplating because they allow us to gain
greater clarity about the intellectual contributions that can potentially flow
from practice-driven knowledge. Importantly, despite the Aristotelian focus on
praxis as an inherently valuable—and independent—form of knowledge, it took
until the late nineteenth century for practice to be taken seriously again. In the
intervening two thousand years, the notion of praxis came to be reinterpreted
as merely a dependent category, “the practical application of a-practical, purely
128
theoretical insights.” The rise of rationalism, from Galileo to Descartes to
Kant, led to the degradation of practical wisdom. Practices were deemed
irrelevant to the ontology of being in the world.
1. Marx
A daring philosophical challenge to this mind-over-matter view of the world
came in 1845 from Karl Marx, at the time a young revolutionary intent on
making a case for the all-important structuring effect of what he called
129
“historical materialism.” In The German Ideology, Marx, together with
Friedrich Engels, raised the analytical status of the practices of everyday life.
Whatever one makes of the ideological content of early and subsequent
variants of Marxism, it is undeniable that Marx and Engels created the first
modern template for recognizing practices and for subjecting them to rigorous
analysis:
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the
language of real life. . . . In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from
heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out
from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of,
imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active
men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the
ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. . . . Life is not determined by
consciousness, but consciousness by life. . . . As soon as this active life-process is
described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists
(themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the
idealists. Where speculation ends—in real life—there real, positive science begins: the
representation
of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of
130
men.

This is still a far cry from practice theory in the twenty-first century, but The
German Ideology, perhaps more than any other work in the modern world,
encouraged and theoretically motivated the analytical preoccupation with
ostensibly mundane aspects of social life, thereby bringing back, albeit in a

128. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 28.
129. On the concept of historical materialism, see, most importantly, KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (1846), as reprinted in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (David
McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000). For an influental and sophisticted contemporary
restatement, see G. A. COHEN, KARL MARX’S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (expanded ed.
2000).
130. MARX & ENGELS, supra note 129, at 175, 180–81.
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different guise, the discarded idea of praxis. Although Aristotle and Marx were
interested with radically different questions of substance, they shared a belief in
the epistemological value of practical knowledge. Whereas Aristotle’s effort in
the ancient world to spread the word about the centrality of practice ultimately
failed, “[o]ne enduring legacy of Marx’s work is the successful attempt to
challenge centuries of Western rationalist and mentalist tradition, and to
legitimate real activity, what ‘sensuous’ people actually do in their everyday life,
as an object of consideration and as an explanatory category in [the] social
131
sciences.” As a consequence of Marx’s attention to the interconnectedness of
social life, and especially his unprecedented focus on individuals as corporeal
beings, practice in the late nineteenth century was “becoming the ontological
132
principle of being in the world.”
2. Heidegger
Recent interpretations of the phenomenological tradition in Western
philosophy, especially of Heidegger’s writings, have led observers to conclude
that the German’s existentialist writings contributed in major ways to the
recovery of practice as a worthwhile object of study in the twentieth century.
Starting with Friedrich Nietzsche, who is often seen as the main impetus behind
the rise of phenomenology, philosophers began to question the contrived
separation of theory and practice that had survived virtually intact since Plato’s
reflections on the topic in the ancient world. Nietzsche, for one, imagined a
primordial unity of theory and practice. As one commentator writes, “Nietzsche
posited at the centre of the activity of philosophy a ‘human, all-too human
subject’ that is not only a thinking subject but an initiator of action and a centre
133
of feeling.” Philosophical inquiries into the nature and boundaries of
existence were at the heart of the phenomenological tradition, as encapsulated
134
most famously in Heidegger’s 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time. In it, he
gave extensive space to the contemplation of what he called Dasein, which
translates literally as “there-being” but was meant to draw attention to the
135
activity of existing, the state of being-in-the-world. The intricacies of this
136
notoriously difficult concept need not concern us here. Relevant for our
purposes is the fact that Heidegger’s interest in the nature of being gave
credence to the investigation of practices, or the inner structure of normality.
Because the fact of existence is not reducible to any a priori logic, Heidegger
sought to come to terms with the essence of what he called “everydayness”
137
(Alltäglichkeit).
131. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 29.
132. Id. at 29.
133. Id. at 33–34.
134. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962).
135. NICOLINI, 43, at 36.
136. For the leading interpretation of Heidegger’s classic, see HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-INTHE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME, DIVISION I (1991).
137. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 34.
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He thought the ordinariness of everydayness was essential to try to grasp
analytically because it was “constantly overlooked in its ontological
138
significance” and yet inherently inescapable as a constant of our existence.
Everydayness, in turn, was comprised of all kinds of social practices.
One’s everyday world is meaningfully structured by these practices which can remain
untaught and yet which we more or less share in common. Practice therefore implies
an individual’s social and historical relation to the world, where one’s own concrete
practices are themselves set up and made meaningful within this wider background
system of intelligibility. Mundane everydayness thus becomes the received, yet
necessarily indeterminate, cultural manifold within which we are all immersed, and
which meaningfully discloses
our world by way of our own un-theorized, everyday
139
practical coping strategies.

From this flows the theoretical argument that the totality of practices that make
up everydayness is so manifold that it usually escapes our attention, and
therewith representation. Practices are seen as nonrepresentational aspects of
social life because even though they affect behavior meaningfully, they tend to
do so in unreflective ways. Practices are the unarticulated underbelly of our
social lives. Because they are part and parcel of our being, we fail to appreciate
their centrality.
Even though Heidegger never developed a coherent account of practical
knowledge, his philosophical writings were essential to the subsequent
development of theories of practice. “[B]y reversing the Cartesian tradition and
making the individual subject dependent on a web of social practices, he made
140
it possible for others to develop one.”
3. Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Austrian philosopher of language, had a similar,
perhaps an even more important effect on the practice turn in contemporary
social theory. As one protagonist of the latter remarked, “Wittgenstein is the
141
philosopher to whom nearly all theorists of practice defer.” As might be
expected, Wittgenstein’s reflections on practice largely emanated from his
theory of language. In the process of developing his all-important concept of
“language games,” he theorized, among other things, the nature of rule
following. The substance of Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings on the
meaning of rules is not of relevance for our discussion. Yet it is important that
his larger theoretical effort led him to think of rule following in terms of
practical knowledge. As he put it in Philosophical Investigations, a collection of
693 numbered paragraphs of theoretical reflections that were published
posthumously in 1953, “‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is
142
obeying a rule is not to obey a rule.” He continues, “When I obey a rule, I do
138.
139.
140.
141.

HEIDEGGER, supra note 134, at 43.
NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 35.
Id. at 37.
H. M. Collins, What Is Tacit Knowledge?, in THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY
THEORY, supra note 9, at 107.
142. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 202 (G. E. M. Anscombe
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143

not choose. I obey the rule blindly.” Wittgenstein introduces the example of a
signpost to elucidate the distinction between thinking behavior (what we might
call choice) and nonthinking behavior (what he thinks of as practice):
Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post—got to do with my
actions? What sort of connexion is there here?—Well, perhaps this one: I have been
trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. But that is
only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the
sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have
further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a
144
regular use of sign-posts, a custom.

Or, as Wittgenstein argued elsewhere, “rules leave loopholes open, and the
145
practice has to speak for itself.” I will draw out the implication of this for the
study of international law below, but for now it is important to appreciate that
Wittgenstein’s concern with the nature and meaning of unreflective behavior,
that is, with the nonrational responses of individuals to their surroundings,
echoes Aristotle’s reflections on praxis, Marx’s interest in practical activity, and
146
Heidegger’s concept of everydayness.
Like his predecessors, Wittgenstein found it difficult to fully grasp,
conceptually and theoretically, the logic of this “inherited background” due to
147
the fact that practical knowledge is just that: practical, not theoretical.
Consequently, its unarticulated nature poses limits to representation. This
restriction notwithstanding, Wittgenstein was convinced that the rationalist
assumption according to which all action was preceded by thought was
untenable. The philosopher Charles Taylor has interpreted Wittgenstein’s
argument thus: “[M]uch of our intelligent action in the world, sensitive as it
usually is to our situation and goals, is carried on unformulated. It flows from an
148
understanding that is largely inarticulate.” Like Heidegger before him,
Wittgenstein believed that “the source of intelligibility of the world is the
average public practices through which alone there can be any understanding at
149
all.” Making these practices visible in the area of international law—and
encouraging practitioners to reflect on and articulate them—is my purpose in
this article. Some philosophers have called for “embodied understandings” of
the world around us to facilitate such an interpretive analysis. As Taylor writes,
Background understanding, which underlies our ability to grasp directions and follow
rules, is to a large degree embodied. . . . As long as we think of understanding in the
old intellectualist fashion, as residing in thoughts or representations, it is hard to
explain how we can know how to follow a rule, or in any way behave rightly, without
trans., 1953) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS].
143. Id. § 219.
144. Id. §198.
145. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY §139 (Denis Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe trans.,
1969) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY].
146. I should note that I reserve the term “behavior” for unintentional and the term “action” for
intentional doings.
147. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY, supra note 145, § 94.
148. CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 170 (1995).
149. DREYFUS, supra note 136, at 155.
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having the thoughts to justify this behavior as right. . . . [I]ntellectualism leaves us only
with the choice between an understanding that consists of representations and no
understanding at all. Embodied understanding provides us with the third alternative
we need to make sense of ourselves.
At the same time, it allows us to show the connections of this understanding to social
practice. My embodied understanding doesn’t only exist in me as an individual agent,
but also as the coagent of common actions. This
is the sense we can give to
150
Wittgenstein’s claim that obeying a rule is a practice.

In the context of language, with which Wittgenstein was concerned in his
reflections on the logic of rules, Wittgenstein insisted that the meaning of a
word could not be determined, at least not fully, by only acquiring the rules
151
according to which the word is used. He argued that there was more to the
construction of meaning. “And this additional element is brought out with the
152
help of the concept of practice.” On Wittgenstein’s argument,
[i]t follows that rules are necessarily related to the established ways of following them.
That has as a consequence that rules actually get their identity from the very practices
in which they are embedded. As such they can never be fully
understood except by
153
those who can successfully perform the practices in question.

Although Wittgenstein was focused on linguistic practices, it is possible to
derive valuable insights from his reflections about the relationship between
meaning and language for the study of other social practices. Simply put,
Wittgenstein sensitized scholars to the possibility that social meaning “cannot
be properly conceived of as properties of individual consciousness,” as
rationalist accounts of the world will have us believe, “and instead should be
conceived relationally as the result of the practical activity of sensuous and
154
engaged agents.” This perspective has not only ontological but also important
methodological implications for the study of practices in international law, as I
shall discuss in detail below, most notably because “[i]n all determination of
sense there does seem to be involved an element of skill as well as an element
155
of familiarity with the actual phenomena concerned.” If we take this to be
true, ethnographic research is a sine qua non for exploring the really existing
practices of the ICC and other sites of international law. But before I turn to
the study of international law, I must sketch in more of the theoretical
background necessary for grasping the potential of treating practices as both
explananda and explanans—as things to be explained and as things that do the
explaining.

150. TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 173.
151. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY, supra note 145, § 139; WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 142, § 202.
152. Kjell S. Johannessen, The Concept of Practice in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, 31 INQUIRY
357, 365 (1988).
153. Id.
154. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 40.
155. Johannessen, supra note 152, at 365.
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4. Giddens
The emphasis in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language on the practical
activity of “sensuous and engaged agents,” as Nicolini put it, reappears in
Anthony Giddens’s sociology, which set out, in the late 1970s, “to promote a
156
recovery of the subject,” without lapsing into subjectivism. In this endeavor,
Giddens, too, turned to the idea of practice. Giddens is also worth mentioning
because his account of structuration—a particular solution to the so-called
agent–structure problem in the social sciences—went on to influence the
construction of (important strands of) constructivism in IR theory, which
represents the most important paradigmatic development in the subfield since
the emergence of neoliberal institutionalism in the late 1970s and the
concomitant rise of rationalism as the dominant perspective from which to
approach the study of international politics (including international law).
In The Constitution of Society, an abstract treatment of ontology, Giddens
157
presented the building blocks of his theory of structuration. To begin with, in
his influential theory Giddens argued against favoring either microlevel or
macrolevel analyses of empirical phenomena. Rather than prioritizing agents
over structures or structures over agents in explanations, he sketched a third
158
ontological way. Traveling down this route required a belief in the mutual
constitution of agents and structures. Through action, so the argument goes,
agents produce structures. Although agents, by operating within structures and
as a consequence of what Giddens termed “reflexive monitoring,” at some
159
point will transform structures, they also are bound by them. This structural
embeddedness can enable agents or constrain them. Either way, agents will, on
Giddens’s argument, draw upon the knowledge—practical and otherwise—that
they continuously acquire in the structural context in which they find
160
themselves when they act. Elsewhere, Giddens summarized the essence of his
theory as follows: “I argue that neither subject (human agent) nor object
(‘society,’ or social institutions) should be regarded as having primacy. Each is
161
constituted in and through recurrent practices.”

156. ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND
CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 44 (1979) [hereinafter GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN
SOCIAL THEORY].
157. GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 45.
158. As has been pointed out many a time, Giddens was, for better or worse, chiefly concerned with
ontology, not with epistemology or methodology.
159. For a more detailed explanation of “reflexive monitoring,” see GIDDENS, CENTRAL
PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 156, at 53–59. See also GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 5–14, 41–45, 78–83.
160. For recent assessments of Giddens’s contribution and its critical reception, see GIDDENS’
THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (Christopher Bryant & David Jary eds., 2012) and ROB STONES,
STRUCTURATION THEORY (2005).
161. Anthony Giddens, Hermeneutics and Social Theory, in PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SOCIAL
THEORY 1, 8 (Anthony Giddens ed., 1982) [hereinafter Giddens, Hermeneutics and Social Theory].
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Interestingly, Giddens draws a straight line from Marx to Wittgenstein to
himself:
I take the significance of Wittgenstein’s writings for social theory to consist in the
association of language with definite social practices. . . . I do want to propose that
there is a direct continuity between Marx and
Wittgenstein in respect of the
162
production and reproduction of society as Praxis.

The operative “theorem” in his theory of structuration is the “duality of
structure,” by which Giddens means “the essential recursiveness of social life,
as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the
reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution
of the agent and social practices, and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this
163
constitution.”
In contradistinction to other theorists of practice we have encountered thus
far, Giddens starts from the premise that agents are both knowledgeable and
164
reflexive. Although these agents behave in part on the basis of tacit, practical
knowledge, Giddens thinks them nevertheless capable of formulating aims,
165
contemplating reasons, and monitoring choices. Put differently, although
agents are not always self-aware, they sometimes are. “Although human actors
usually proceed unhampered in their daily business they are by no means
structural dupes. . . . Giddens’ pressing task is that of reversing the conceptual
elimination of the subject and promoting its recovery without lapsing into
166
subjectivism.” Theodore Schatzki has provided the most lucid—if dense—
representation of the place of practices in Giddens’s theory of structuration.
Schatzki’s summary is worth reproducing at length, because it also relates the
phenomenon of practices to all of the other moving parts in Giddens’s
complicated account of the duality of structure in the constitution of society:
[S]tructures are sets of rules and resources, which are at once the medium in which
practices are carried out and the renewed result of their execution. Since practices
compose systems, the structural properties of social systems are likewise sets of rules
and resources . . . that are both medium and result of system practices. What’s more,
since practices and systems are composed of actions, the ultimate reason why rules
and resources structure practices and systems is that actors draw on rules and
resources in their interactions. In doing so, they perpetuate the practices of whose
structure the rules and resources are elements, and thereby also help reproduce the
167
social system composed by these (and other) practices.

The above sketch of logical entanglements illustrates what recursiveness is
all about for Giddens. The recursive reproduction of the social is eased to the
extent that practices are routinized, which is the case whenever they are taken
for granted: “Routines provide both cognitive economy and anxiety reduction

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 156, at 4.
Id. at 5.
NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 47.
Id.
Id.
SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 146.
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168

and control.”
Central to Giddens’s account of the logic of practices are two additional
concepts: rules and resources. The former refer to norms and codes that
describe the generalized procedures involved in the constitution of practices;
the latter connote the material and symbolic capabilities that enable—or
169
disable—opportunities for action. Practices, according to Giddens, “‘happen’
and are ‘made to happen’ through the application of resources in the continuity
170
of daily life.” In explicating this continuity, Giddens puts a premium on what
he calls “practical consciousness,” or tacit modes of knowing that come about
without reflection, let alone deliberation. As he remarked with reference to
linguistic practices,
A double occlusion occurs if the area of practical consciousness is left unexplored, as
has characteristically been the case in much research work in sociology. If what actors
are able to say about the conditions of their activity appears slight, or unconvincing,
the researcher begins to cast about for other factors which determine why they behave
as they do. To adopt such a tactic is to blank out the very grounding of human
knowledgeability in the continuity of skilfully reproduced practices. It is like
supposing that what the speakers of a language can articulate about the rules171and
procedures they use in speaking or writing is all they “know” about the language.

It is important to appreciate in this context that Giddens, in a major
intellectual departure, advanced practice theory by relating representational to
nonrepresentational aspects of action, making a case for the co-constitution of
action. He insisted that social practices should be viewed as a “conjunction of
172
intended and unintended outcomes of conduct.”
One consequence of
Giddens’s self-proclaimed recovery of the subject, in other words, was the
creation of a locus for rationality in practice theory. Previous theorists, as we
have seen, felt compelled to equate all practical action with a nonrational way
of doing things.
What does this understanding of practices have to offer the study of the
practice of international law? The problem with Giddens, as many of his critics
have pointed out, is his unwillingness or inability (perhaps both) to translate his
abstract ideas about the constitution of society into viable research designs for
173
empirical inquiry. As one observer recently noted, “Giddens not only did not
put his theory to the test of empirical research, he also failed to provide any
exemplification of his approach, and explicitly refrained and even resisted
putting his theory into a methodological package for pursuing empirical

168. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 48.
169. GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 156, at 65–69.
170. Giddens, Hermeneutics and Social Theory, supra note 161, at 9–10.
171. Anthony Giddens, Comments on the Theory of Structuration, 13 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 75,
76 (1983).
172. Id. at 77.
173. Giddens initially appears to have tried, however. See GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 327–43 (reflecting on the implications of structuration theory for empirical
research, notably the “hermeneutic aspects” of both quantitative and qualitative research and the
interrelationship between these two forms of social inquiry).
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174

inquiry.” For now it is sufficient to note that the idea of practice is the
linchpin in Giddens’s theory of structuration, as a result of which it gained
greater currency in the social sciences. The notion is so central in fact that
Giddens, together with Pierre Bourdieu, is sometimes thought to be a
175
figurehead of a research program known as “social praxeology.”
C. Postmodern Perspectives
1. Bourdieu
It is sometimes said that Bourdieu, a French sociologist, left a greater mark
on practice theory than Giddens. The reason for this perceived contribution is
usually attributed to the former’s willingness to conduct empirical research,
ethnographic and otherwise:
Bourdieu always believed in the fundamental importance of starting the study of
human conducts from the appreciation and representation of real-time practices.
However, one of his key theoretical points was that representing practice is not
enough: practice needs to be explained, and this is what makes sociologists different
from anthropologists and other social scientists. While the object of the work of the
latter is what practices are and how they behave, the former need to address the issue
of why practices are the way they are and why they are not different. To this end, he
developed over the years a theory of both practice and “practice-based theorizing”
that has fundamental implications for any attempts to extend practice thinking to new
176
domains such as organization studies.

Because I am concerned in this article with just such an endeavor—the
extension of practice theory to the study of international law—a closer look at
Bourdieu’s writings is essential.
In Distinction, his famous book on the judgment of taste, Bourdieu captured
the essence of his logic of practice thus:
[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice

177

Although space constraints disallow an in-depth discussion of Bourdieu’s
theoretical concepts, a brief primer is in order. In Bourdieu’s parlance, the
concept of habitus refers to a deeply inscribed—and internalized—way of
knowing that individuals acquire in passing as a by-product of all forms of
178
socialization, whether at home, at work, or at play. As the theoretical linchpin
174. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 50. The disinterest in empirical explification is germane to most of
the philosophers and social theorists whose ideas I have brought into the fold of this theoretical
contribution to the study of international law. In response to this general predicament, I will, below,
outline a concrete, if tentative, agenda for making empirical contributions to the practical study of
international law in the form of what I refer to as analytic narratives. See supra Part VI.
175. The term was coined by Loïc Wacquant. See Loïc Wacquant, Toward a Social Praxeology: The
Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology, in AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 1, 11
(Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc J. D. Wacquant eds., 1992).
176. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 53.
177. PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 101
(1984) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION].
178. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 55.
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of his far-ranging writings, the presence of habitus, Bourdieu argued, is
knowledge-producing in the sense that its structural properties constitute a
particular type of social environment, which, in turn, enable—and delimit—
practical action by individuals in and on the world. Put differently, for
Bourdieu, the irrepressible force of habitus serves at all times as a parameter to
individual choice, usually without being noticed. Here is how the French
sociologist put it himself, if a tad obscurely:
[Habitus is a] system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate
and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming
at ends or an express mastery of
179
the operations necessary in order to attain them.

Though, on Bourdieu’s account, the concept of habitus is indispensable to
the production of practices, it is not alone sufficient for constituting social
practices. Rather, practices are produced by the interaction of habitus with two
related concepts—namely, capital and field. Again, both terms come with a
great deal of theoretical baggage, which I am sidestepping for ease of
presentation. Simply put, the concept of capital connotes all material and
nonmaterial forms of currency that are suitable for and used in the pursuit of a
given interest, from accumulation to domination. The definition of a given
interest is governed by one’s habitus, which has a strong relationship to group
and class membership. The concept of the field, finally, captures the
constellation of forces that, semiautonomously, generate the rules by which
positions of authority, power, legitimacy, and influence are defined and
allocated in a given society. Most societies are comprised of numerous fields,
many of which coincide with major spheres of life, including art, education, law,
politics, and religion, to name but a few. Bourdieu’s logic of practice assumes
that a mutually constitutive relationship exists between habitus and field,
facilitated by the circulation of capital: “[I]nvolvement in a field shapes the
habitus that, once activated, reproduces the field. On the other hand, habitus
only operates in relation with the state of the field and on the basis of the
180
possibilities of action granted by the capital associated with the position.” On
this conceptual foundation, we can return to the schematic formula of
181
Bourdieu’s “general science of practices” with which we began.

179. BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 53. For an example of readings
critical of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, see Raymond W. K. Lau, Habitus and the Practical Logic of
Practice: An Interpretation, 38 SOC. 369 (2004).
180. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 60. For an incisive critique of what he calls Bourdieu’s “conceptual
morass,” especially as it pertains to the interacting concepts of field and practice, see Alan Warde,
Practice and Field: Revising Bourdieusian Concepts (Ctr. for Research on Innovation and Competition,
Univ. of Manchester, Discussion Paper No. 65, 2004), available at http://www.cric.ac.uk/
cric/pdfs/dp65.pdf.
181. For a sustained critique of Bourdieu’s effort to develop a “general science of practice,” see
Theodore Richard Schatzki, Overdue Analysis of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, 30 INQUIRY 113
(1987).
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The simple formula conveys both the theoretical unity and diversity at the
heart of Bourdieu’s practice theory. On the one hand, his formulaic depiction
suggests that the logic of practices is a constant feature of social interaction; on
the other hand, it also makes plain that the logic of practices differs with
context. Accordingly, Bourdieu speaks of “the unity hidden under the diversity
and multiplicity of the set of practices performed in fields governed by different
182
logics and therefore inducing different forms of realization.” In other words,
practices are pervasive and constantly involved in the construction of social
reality. Yet their precise effect is a function of the interplay between habitus
and capital and the characteristics of a particular field. For much of his
intellectual life Bourdieu was intrigued by the relationship between induction
and deduction. With his imperfect and reductionist formula, he may well have
intended to strike a balance between the tenets of subjectivist and objectivist
modes of knowledge, both of which he rejected in their pure forms.
Although Bourdieu was not always as subtle and consistent in articulating
the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism as he could have been, one
of his enduring contributions to practice theory was to attach individuals
relationally to the social and historical contexts in which they dwell. His
relational method was founded on a deep-seated suspicion of all attempts to
reify the attributes of individuals and groups. It therefore comes as no surprise
that he deemed descriptive accounts by practitioners analytically worthless.
One of Bourdieu’s leading interpreters explains why:
This epistemological stance is necessitated by the very nature of insider accounts of
their own practices. Insider representations reflect the practical logic of getting along
in their social world, and hence are to be understood as instruments of struggle for
practical accomplishments rather than attempts to draw a coherent and objective
picture of actor behavior. While scientific representations are constructed out of the
representations of everyday practices, the latter cannot be substituted for the
183
former.

What follows from this for the study of practice in international law? It
follows that purely descriptive accounts of any international legal practice will
not be enough to render comprehensible its social logic and effects, especially in
organizational settings. The Bourdieusian analysis of practices “involves the
construction of the fields where they occur and the habitus of the agents
184
brought to those fields” as well as the kinds of capital under their command.
This explicitly theoretical approach to practice is immediately relevant to this
issue on the ICC. With Bourdieu I believe that “theory must be used to recover
the practice of the agents about which it theorizes and, in doing so, becomes
185
itself a practical, engaged social activity.” At the same time, it is noteworthy
that Bourdieu was averse to speaking of “praxis,” a term that he detested

182. BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION, supra note 177, at 101.
183. DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU 56 (1997).
184. Id. at 142.
185. Derek Robbins, Theory of Practice, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS 37 (Michael
Grenfell ed., 2008).
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because it “tends to create the impression of something pompously
186
theoretical.” This semantic preference is suggestive of Bourdieu’s most
important contribution to practice theory, namely the striking of a third way
between purely nomothetic and purely ideographic modes of reasoning about
the everyday.
For Bourdieu, neither deduction nor induction is sufficient for making us
comprehend the logic of practice. As he put it, “science has a time which is not
187
that of practice” and “practice has a logic which is not that of the logician.” In
other words, only reflexivity—another key concept that I must largely
sidestep—can help us avoid the intellectual pitfalls that are associated with both
metatheory and microhistory. “Practice theory is in this perspective to be
understood as an ontological sensitivity and a set of epistemic preferences; that
is, a way of theorizing, instead of a corpus of universally valid normative
188
statements.” From my perspective, Bourdieu’s “general science of practices”
is an ambitious—yet still relatively modest—theoretical framework for
explicating how agents and structures constitute one another in everyday
organizational life. Notwithstanding inconsistencies in his approach—and the
conceptual confusion to which he also contributed—it is eminently helpful for
thinking about the practice of international law because it “destabilizes the
boundaries between general abstraction as theory and fact-finding as
189
methodology.” At a time when the study of international law continues to be
driven by either data or doctrine, a deliberately scientific view of practices,
along the lines sketched by Bourdieu, holds the promise for an improved
understanding of the reality of international law.
In designing the issue of which this article forms a part, I have, not unlike
Bourdieu, been cognizant of the twin dangers of what we might call, for lack of
better terms, “excessive theorizing” and “excessive empiricizing” when it comes
to the study of the ICC. Excessive theorizing is easily grasped. It refers to
metatheoretical waffling about the nature of international adjudication, devoid
of empirical grounding. This resembles Bourdieu’s methodological stance. As
Didier Bigo writes,
Bourdieu opposes any “social theorist” speaking about state and society in
generalized abstract terms and avoiding the difficult empirical work of in-depth
investigation about how many individuals or groups think or speak the same way as
the “analyst,”
and how many social universes share this so-called academic reading of
190
their lives.

186. PIERRE BOURDIEU, Fieldwork in Philosophy, in IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 3, 22 (Pierre Bourdieu ed., 1990).
187. BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 9; PIERRE BOURDIEU &
JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 86 (1990).
188. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 66.
189. Didier Bigo, Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of
Power, 5 INT’L POL. SOC. 225, 231 (2011).
190. Id. at 234.
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What I call excessive empiricizing, next, refers to the production of
nonanalytical narratives, that is, descriptions of international legal processes
that fail to bring any form of abstract reasoning to bear. Excessive empiricizing,
as I conceive of it, comes in two variants: “excessive doctrinalism” and
“excessive description.” The first refers to the important, yet analytically
sometimes very partial, accounts of technical considerations pertaining to
international legal proceedings. The second connotes the “old institutionalist”
tendency, alluded to in part II above, of many international legal scholars to
merely describe the developments in international courts, usually with detailed
reference to institutional rules and case law, without trying to theoretically and
systematically inquire into the determinants of what I have elsewhere called
191
legal contention. Bourdieu is a useful ally in the quest for more rigor in the
study of international law. His practice theory is particularly helpful for our
purposes because his concept of habitus, as Nicolini points out,
becomes a viable alternative to the idea of organizational culture, the catch-all blanket
concept introduced in the 1980s. Not only is habitus analytically more precise and
convincing, it is also historically situated, open to contestation, and sensitive to power
conflicts, all aspects that the functionalist concept of organizational culture is unable
192
to capture.

Not everyone agrees. Stephen Turner, in an important challenge to
Bourdieu’s practice theory, sought to burst the Frenchman’s bubble about the
explanatory potential of social practices:
The idea of ‘practice’ and its cognates has this odd kind of promissory utility. They
promise that they can be turned into something more precise. But the value of the
concepts is destroyed when they are pushed in the direction of meeting their promise.
New objects—habitus instead of norms, norms instead of mores—are proposed. New
explanatory successes, usually restricted to a small range of phenomena, occur. . . . So
the project itself is never challenged, but it never succeeds either, at least in the way it
would succeed if the structure of the beast [that is, the thing to be explained] were
gradually being revealed. Instead we get, so to speak, different kinds of scans of the
beast, each of which cannot be improved beyond a certain level of fuzziness, and each
193
of which gives somewhat different and inconsistent or difficult-to-integrate pictures.

Turner’s cautionary note is well-taken. One of the challenges of developing
methodological guidelines for the interpretive study of international law is
precisely related to the difficult task of operationalizing fuzzy concepts derived
from metatheory, which is why I began this article with an overview of
conceptual similarities and differences across a number of important practice
theorists. This limitation notwithstanding, Bourdieu’s account of the logic of
practice is undoubtedly a major contribution. This being so, it deserves close
scrutiny in the outline of a theory of international law as practice. Here, then, is
the rub:
Bourdieu’s theory of practice can be seen as an attempt to transform static, onedimensional views of social space into a larger differentiated, stratified, and
191. JENS MEIERHENRICH, LAWFARE: THE FORMATION AND DEFORMATION OF GACACA
JURISDICTIONS IN RWANDA, 1994–2012 (forthcoming 2014).
192. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 67.
193. TURNER, supra note 113, at 116.
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multidimensional view. By appealing to homologies existing both between habitus and
social fields and between different social fields, Bourdieu claims to account for social
stability, order, and reproduction. Conversely, by emphasizing both that the habitus
allows for continuous improvisation, and that social structures, as products of history,
contain tensions, oppositions, and contradictions,
he provides for history, change,
194
resistance, and social transformation.

2. De Certeau
Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s significant contribution to theorizing the nature
and logic of practices, critics have bemoaned the comprehensive—and
expansive—nature of his practice theory. They have shone light on the
totalizing tendencies that the social theorist, in their eyes, shared with another
French sociologist, Michel Foucault. Foremost among these critics was the
French Jesuit and interdisciplinary scholar Michel de Certeau. In his view,
Bourdieu’s all-encompassing empirical accounts, especially of the Kabylia
region of Algeria, where the latter conducted ethnographic fieldwork, fall
significantly short. “Bourdieu’s texts are fascinating in their analyses and
195
aggressive in their theory,” writes de Certeau. But Bourdieu’s argument, he
notes,
is concerned less to indicate . . . reality th[a]n to show its necessity and the advantages
of his hypothesis for the theory. Thus the habitus becomes a dogmatic place, if one
takes dogma to mean the affirmation of a “reality” which the discourse needs in order
to be totalizing. No doubt it still has, like many dogmas, the heuristic value of
196
displacing and renewing possibilities of research.

On the foundation of this critique, which de Certeau supports with ample
evidence, he develops an alternative practice theory, albeit one that is
considerably more modest in its ambition than Bourdieu’s, and one that zooms
in on the mundane of everyday life, especially practices of consumption.
Inasmuch as the mundane aspects of social behavior also play a role in other
practice theories, notably Bourdieu’s, de Certeau brought an entirely new
dedication to their analysis. His focus and that of his collaborators was on
“minor practices,” as he called them:
A society is . . . composed of certain foregrounded practices organizing its normative
institutions and of innumerable other practices that remain “minor,” always there but
not organizing discourses and preserving the beginnings or remains of different
(institutional, scientific) hypotheses for that society or for others. It is in this
multifarious
and silent “reserve” of procedures that we should look for “consumer”
197
practices.

Iver Neumann rightly points out that de Certeau must be considered a poststructuralist in that he considered “the hunt for latent structures as ahistorical
198
and asocial.” For de Certeau, social life was “contingent, not anchored in

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

KEITH TOPPER, THE DISORDER OF POLITICAL INQUIRY 170–71 (2005).
MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 59 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
Iver B. Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy, 31
MILLENNIUM 627, 633 (2002) [hereinafter Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn].
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199

something outside itself.” Emerging in the context of a much broader corpus
of French scholarship on the meaning of the quotidian (everyday)—most
notably in the writings of Henri Lefebvre, Roland Barthes, and Georges
Perec—de Certeau’s account pushed the boundaries of practice theory in
remarkable ways, not least by giving a novel account of action. Through his
focus on consumption—an activity often said to be undertaken by docile
subjects rather than tactical agents—he sought to challenge conventional
200
wisdom about the determinants of everyday behavior. More specifically, by
imagining consumers as “producers” in their own right, de Certeau helped
elevate the profane to a level worthy of serious theoretical reflection.
Furthermore, by thinking of practices in terms of “tactics,” he linked
Foucault’s (at the time of de Certeau’s writing, rather recent) insights about
201
disciplinary power to the study of practices. And yet, parting ways with
Foucault, his aim was
not to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary
technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed,
tactical, and make-shift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of
‘discipline.’ Pushed to their ideal limits, these procedures and ruses of202consumers
compose the network of an antidiscipline which is the subject of this book,

as he put it in The Practice of Everyday Life, the first volume of what was
203
supposed to be a multivolume analysis. This theoretical point requires
unpacking, because it cuts to the heart of de Certeau’s principal contribution to
practice theory, which revolves around the conceptualization of practices as
tactics, by which he meant “calculated action which is determined by the
204
absence of a proper place.” Tactics, according to de Certeau,
has no place except in that of the other. Also it must play with the terrain imposed on
it, organized by the law of a strange force. It does not have the means of containing
itself in itself, in a position of retreat, of anticipating, of gathering itself . . . . It profits
from and depends upon “occasions” without a base in which to stock supplies, to
augment a proper space, and to anticipate sorties. What it gains cannot be held. This
non-space doubtless permits mobility, but requires amenability to the hazards of time,
in order to seize the possibilities that a moment offers. It must vigilantly utilize the
gaps which the particular combination of circumstances open in the control of the
proprietary power. It poaches there. It creates surprises. It is possible for it to be
205
where no one expects it.

199. Id.
200. For the justification of his focus on consumption (or “usage”) as object of study, see DE
CERTEAU, supra note 195, at vii–xiv.
201. For an engagement with Foucault’s writings on disciplinary power, see, for example, id. at 45–
48.
202. Id. at xiv–xv.
203. Due to de Certeau’s untimely death, only the first volume of L’invention du quotidien, as the
project is called in French, appeared during his lifetime. A second volume was published posthumously.
See MICHEL DE CERTEAU, LUCE GIARD & PIERRE MAYOL, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE,
VOLUME 2: LIVING AND COOKING (1998).
204. Michel de Certeau, On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life, 3 SOC. TEXT 3, 6 (1980)
[hereinafter de Certeau, On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life].
205. Id.
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What this opaque formulation means is that the choice of tactics (as
opposed to what de Certeau calls “strategies”) is generally the domain of agents
who lack power, not those who possess it. “Cracks, glints, slippages, brainstorms
within the established grids of a given system: such are the style of these tactical
practices, which are the equivalent in the realm of action of wit and the
206
witticism in the realm of language.” Making explicit reference to Carl von
Clausewitz, the Prussian military strategist, de Certeau likened the practices of
207
consumption to weapons of the weak. De Certeau’s use of the term
208
“antidiscipline” was deliberate and programmatic in that it encapsulated his
lifelong faith in the ability of ordinary men—and women—to evade the
strictures of their disciplined lives, if only intermittently. From his perspective,
everyday practices—including the seemingly innocuous practices of
consumption—afforded otherwise marginal individuals the power to
occasionally resist domination. He coined the term “oppositional practices” to
capture the power that he believed attached to such “tricks of the ‘weak’” as
“[d]welling, walking, spelling, reading, shopping, cooking,” all of which
activities, de Certeau claimed, “present many of the characteristics of tactical
209
ruses and surprises.” As he put it elsewhere,
Many everyday practices (talking, reading, moving about, shopping, cooking, etc.) are
tactical in character. And so are, more generally, many “ways of operating”: victories
of the “weak” over the “strong” (whether the strength be that of powerful people or
the violence of things or of an imposed order, etc.), clever tricks, knowing how to get
away with things, “hunter’s cunning,” maneuvers, polymorphic simulations, joyful
discoveries, poetic as well as warlike. The Greeks called these “ways of operating”
210
mētis.

For de Certeau, then, “[t]he tactics of consumption, the ingenious ways in
which the weak make use of the strong . . . lend a political dimension to
211
everyday practices.” He conceived of them as artistic interventions in the
space structurally delimited by the operation of the modes of production, which
is why he once described them as “the most normative institutions of modern
212
times.” But unlike other social theorists, including Bourdieu, de Certeau is
more optimistic about the role of individual agency. As Michael Sheringham
writes,
For [de] Certeau, there is a glaring opposition between Bourdieu’s account of the way
practices work in the space between subjects and systems, an account which has many
affinities with [de] Certeau’s account of tactical play, and the way Bourdieu ultimately
denies any freedom or control to individual subjects by his insistence on the way they

206. Id. at 7.
207. DE CERTEAU, supra note 195, at 37–38 (describing tactics as an “art of the weak”).
208. See supra text accompanying note 202.
209. de Certeau, On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life, supra note 204, at 8.
210. DE CERTEAU, supra note 195, at xix.
211. Id. at xvii. This is reminiscent of what the anthropologist James C. Scott, several years later,
would famously come to call “weapons of the weak” in his study of rural resistance to formal authority
in Malaysia. See JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT
RESISTANCE (1985).
212. de Certeau, On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life, supra note 204, at 4.
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act out their habitus unconsciously and passively—in ‘docta ignorantia’—Bourdieu’s
213
logic of practices is based on reproduction rather than production.

The agentic focus on production is relevant to the study of practices of
international law because it encourages us to look for tactical behavior in even
the unlikeliest of places. As a theoretical insight, it has the potential to upend
conventional ways of thinking about where, exactly, power is located in the
international legal arena, who wields it, and how. De Certeau indirectly
sensitizes scholars of IL and IR to take seriously the power of the mundane.
This is not to say, for example, that every low-level bureaucrat in, say, an
international court exercises power in a manner that is either noticeable or
significant for understanding international legal outcomes, but it does suggest
that something analytically worthwhile could be gained by ceasing to ignore the
mundane aspects of international law. More specifically, de Certeau is
interesting because he, unlike any other practice theorist of note, is sensitive to
those on the margins of life. In an era in which IL and IR scholarship is
becoming more sensitive to those on the margins of international law, de
Certeau’s oeuvre may offer useful insights for studying these lifeworlds.
3. Schatzki
Schatzki, whom we already encountered, ranks among the most
214
sophisticated and philosophical of contemporary practice theorists.
In
addition to having been at the forefront of popularizing the so-called practice
turn in the social sciences, notably with the publication, in 2001, of the coedited
collection The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, Schatzki has left his
mark by vocally pushing back against the supremacy in practice theory of the
ideas of Bourdieu and Giddens. More specifically, he has reintroduced into the
conversation Wittgenstein’s ideas about practice. For Schatzki, Wittgenstein’s
ideas are preferable to those developed by either Bourdieu or Giddens, notably
because the Austrian–British philosopher did not “overintellectualize
215
practices” as they are said to have done.
In his quest for an “anti-theoretical” position toward practice, Schatzki has
taken particular issue with Bourdieu and Giddens because he claims they—by
virtue of their integrated models of society emphasizing the centrality of
structuration and habitus respectively—have smuggled objective rules into their
theories of practice, thereby undermining the ethos of practice-based
216
reasoning. Here is how Raymond Caldwell succinctly summarizes the most
important of Schatzki’s critiques:

213. MICHAEL SHERINGHAM,
TO THE PRESENT 215 (2006).

EVERYDAY LIFE: THEORIES AND PRACTICES FROM SURREALISM

214. SCHATZKI, THE SITE OF THE SOCIAL, supra note 51; see supra notes 51–58 and accompanying
text.
215. Theodore R. Schatzki, Practices and Actions: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Bourdieu and
Giddens, 27 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 283, 285 (1997) [hereinafter Schatzki, Practices and Actions].
216. See id. at 297–300.
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Schatzki criticizes Giddens and Bourdieu for misconceiving rule-following in an overly
intellectual and deterministic manner. Giddens incorporates rules into his conception
of practical consciousness as a mode of tacit knowledge that defines how actors know
how to go on in practical situations without reference to intentionality. This idea is
then incorporated into Giddens’s broader theory of agency and structure: rulefollowing agents appear to produce and reproduce the “virtual order” of structuration.
In contrast, Bourdieu argues that practices are not the outcome of rule-following by
individuals, but are instead the pre-reflective enactment of various schemes of rule
governed behaviour that occupy or reside within the “habitus” of individuals. These
pre-reflective schemas within individual habitus cause actors to execute or carry out
actions . . . . Schatzki objects to both of these positions because they appear
to assume
217
that implicit rules have objective effects in that they order social action.

This is unacceptable to Schatzki, for whom the most appealing aspect of
practice-based reasoning is precisely the contingent nature of action, what he
218
calls “the unformulability of practical understanding.” For example, for him
“Bourdieu’s account (and to a lesser extent Giddens’s) too strongly portrays
actions as proceeding out of mastery and control: knowing how to go on, the
219
sense of this and that.”
In another respect, Schatzki’s theory of practice is noteworthy for its
downplaying of the linguistic dimensions of practices. As he writes,
“Intelligibility is ultimately and (one presumes) originally a practical
220
phenomenon that is not entirely recouped in language.” This positioning was
in part a response to the prevalence of linguistics and discourse theory in late
twentieth-century social theory. Influenced by Wittgenstein, Schatzki rejected
the preoccupation with language and signification. As one interpreter of
Schatzki’s practice theory writes, “Schatzki has to keep language firmly in check
if he is to partly justify the primacy of practice and a practice-oriented view of
agency. If language (I speak) takes priority over practice (I do) then agency can
221
dissolve into discourse, signification, talk, text or conversation.”
The IR scholar Iver Neumann not long ago engaged the relationship
between practice and discourse, presumably inspired by Schatzki’s critique. Yet
unlike the philosopher, Neumann has sought to find an analytical place for both
discourse and practice, which he sees as standing in a dynamic relationship
mutually constituting culture. Though he shares some of Schatzki’s discontent
about some methodological excesses associated with the linguistic turn,
222
Neumann concedes that “practice cannot be thought ‘outside of’ discourse.”
At the same time, he bemoans the tendency toward “armchair analysis,” by
which he means “text-based analyses of global politics that are not
complemented by different kinds of contextual data from the field, data that
may illuminate how foreign policy and global politics are experienced as lived
217. Raymond Caldwell, Reclaiming Agency, Recovering Change? An Exploration of the Practice
Theory of Theodore Schatzki, 42 J. FOR THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 283, 293–94 (2012).
218. Schatzki, Practices and Actions, supra note 215, at 300.
219. Id. at 301.
220. SCHATZKI, SOCIAL PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 128.
221. Caldwell, supra note 217, at 287.
222. Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn, supra note 198, at 628.
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practices.”
Inasmuch as Schatzki’s critique of overemphasis on language and discourse
in practice theory is well-taken, it remains to be seen whether his de facto
dismissal of Bourdieu (and to a lesser extent of Giddens) will leave a mark on
the adaptation of practice theory for the study of international law. Thus far the
handful of IL and IR studies of international practices that currently exist have
invoked Bourdieu’s theory of practice more than that of any other social
theorist, notwithstanding Schatzki’s fundamental disagreement.
4. Wenger
Lastly, Etienne Wenger, not unlike the aforementioned Flyvbjerg with his
project of a phronetic social science, pushed practice theory more selfconsciously in the direction of policy application. In an attempt to better
understand—and ultimately affect—the determinants of learning in
postmodern society, Wenger, an education specialist, began to investigate the
224
social dimensions of knowledge acquisition. In his effort to complement
biological, cognitive, linguistic, and other dominant theories of learning, he
coined the evocative term “communities of practice.” The novel, and by now
hugely influential (at least in policy circles) concept was meant to capture the
inherently—and inescapably—collective logic of learning. “Over time,”
according to Wenger,
this collective learning results in practices that reflect both the pursuit of our
enterprises and the attendant social relations. These practices are thus the property of
a kind of community created over time by the sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise.
It makes sense, therefore, to call these kinds of communities communities of
225
practice.

For Wenger, the three defining attributes of a community of practice were
the existence of (1) a community of mutual engagement, (2) a negotiated
enterprise, and (3) a repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over
226
time.
The communitarian ethos (and strong policy orientation) that
undergirds this most recent theory of practice sets it apart from the more
critically minded practice theorists that we have encountered thus far. In this
sense Wenger, like Flyvbjerg, has more in common with Aristotle than with
Bourdieu or Schatzki when it comes to thinking about the logic of practices.
Whereas Wenger and Flyvbjerg are primarily interested in making a managerial

223. Id.
224. On the policy imperative in Wenger’s work, see, for example, Etienne C. Wenger & William
M. Snyder, Communities of Practice: The Organizational Frontier, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at
139, and, in expanded form, ETIENNE WENGER, RICHARD MCDERMOTT & WILLIAM M. SNYDER,
CULTIVATING COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO MANAGING KNOWLEDGE (2002). For a
tentative assessment of the concept’s salience in the policy domain, see, for example, Masoud Hemmasi
& Carol M. Csanda, The Effectiveness of Communities of Practice: An Empirical Study, 21 J.
MANAGERIAL ISSUES 262 (2009).
225. ETIENNE WENGER, COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: LEARNING, MEANING, AND IDENTITY 45
(1998).
226. Id. at 73.
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contribution, Bourdieu and Schatzki are more concerned with making a
methodological one. This nontrivial difference notwithstanding, ontological
similarities are immediately observable. Consider Wenger’s definition of
practice, which bespeaks his intellectual debt to virtually all of the practice
theorists who preceded him, notably to their declared objective of transcending
the distinction between agents and structures. Though less parsimonious than
other theories, Wenger’s amounts to an integrated compilation of salient (and
instantly recognizable) attributes of practice:
The concept of practice connotes doing, but not just doing in and of itself. It is doing
in historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do. In this
sense, practice is always social practice. Such a concept of practice includes both the
explicit and the tacit. It includes what is said and what is left unsaid; what is
represented and what is assumed. It includes the language, tools, documents, images,
symbols, well-defined roles, specified criteria, codified procedures, regulations, and
227
contracts that various practices make explicit for a variety of purposes.

But, says Wenger, his concept of the Backgound also includes
all the implicit relations, tacit conventions, subtle cues, untold rules of thumb,
recognizable intuitions, specific perceptions, well-tuned sensitivities, embodied
understandings, underlying assumptions, and shared world views. Most of these may
never be articulated, yet they are unmistakable signs of membership in communities
of practice and are crucial to the success of their enterprises. Of course, the tacit is
what we take for granted and so tends to fade into the background. If it is not
forgotten, it tends to be relegated to the individual subconscious, to what we all know
instinctively, to what comes naturally. But the tacit is no more individual and natural
than what we make explicit to each other. Common sense is only commonsensical
because it is sense held in common. Communities of practice are the prime context in
which we can work out common sense through mutual engagement. Therefore, the
concept of practice highlights the social and negotiated character of both the explicit
228
and the tacit in our lives.

One is reminded in this context of what the philosopher John Searle, in his
229
famous writings on intentionality, termed “the thesis of the Background.” On
this argument, “Intentional states function only given a set of Background
230
capacities that do not themselves consist in intentional phenomena.” What
Searle means is that many of our everyday activities are governed by
unconscious mental states that must be factored into explanatory accounts if we
are serious about figuring out why we act in the ways that we do. Accordingly,
he theorizes what he calls “Background causation” in contradistinction to
231
“decision theoretic models of rationality.” Here is one of numerous, realworld examples upon which Searle relies to persuade:
Suppose I am driving to work, or suppose I am sitting in a restaurant looking at the
menu and trying to decide what to eat. In such cases it seems implausible to say that I
am performing a set of calculations to try to get myself on a higher indifference curve,

227. Id. at 47.
228. Id.
229. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 129 (1995) (capitalization in
original).
230. Id. at 129.
231. Id. at 137–39.
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Although the practice of international law will almost always involve far
greater levels of complexity than are commonly associated with driving and
meal times, the overall insight applies: Not all international legal practices are
based on deliberation or calculation. Rather, as in every other professional
sphere, a substantial portion of everyday lawyering rests on habitual,
routinized, ritualistic, repetitive, or mundane behavior. It is therefore plausible
to assume that in the study of international law, as elsewhere, “a conception of
rationality as a set of specific, well-defined operations over sharply delineated,
233
explicit intentional contents is inadequate.” Instead, with Searle, we ought to
want to be able to marshal accounts “that will explain the intricacy, the
complexity, and the sensitivity of our behavior as well as explaining its
234
spontaneity, creativity, and originality.”
Though not rejecting “intentionalistic explanation” per se, Searle carves out
analytical space for a path right down the middle between behaviorism and
235
structuralism. It is here that his argument about “Background” causation
comes into play. In addition to serving other so-called functions, Searle’s
Background facilitates linguistic interpretation, provides motivational
dispositions, and enables the narrative (and dramatic) construction of
236
experience. Couched in these terms, the connecting points between his
philosophy of mind and various iterations of practice theory are remarkable
indeed.
Interestingly, Searle explicitly acknowledges the definitional overlap
between the conceptual hinge of his theory of intentionality and some of the
terms that I have herein associated with practice theory:
My discussion of the Background is related to other discussions in contemporary
philosophy. I think that much of Wittgenstein’s later work is about what I call the
Background. And if I understand him correctly, Pierre Bourdieu’s important work on
the “habitus” is about the same sort of phenomena that I call the Background. In the
history of philosophy, I believe [David] Hume was the first philosopher to recognize
the centrality of the Background in explaining human cognition, and Nietzsche was
237
the philosopher most impressed by its radical contingency.

But let me get back to Wenger, who ultimately contributed more to practice
theory than Searle. (Searle’s contribution was important but incidental,
Wenger’s, integral.) Wenger developed his theory of learning by
quadrangulating insights from what he termed theories of social structure, of
identity, of situated experience, and of social practice, all of which, on his
argument, are located at the intersection of four broader intellectual

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 138.
SEARLE, supra note 229, at 139.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 138–39.
See id. at 130–37.
Id. at 132.
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traditions. As with some of the other theories of practice, the details need not
concern us. What does bear emphasizing is Wenger’s pragmatic (in all senses of
the word) attitude toward empirical research. As a consultant on issues of
learning, Wenger is arguably more results-oriented than most other practice
theorists. By this I mean that he is clearly intent on bringing about change in the
way we learn; but he also appreciates the need to gather data in support of his
theoretical (and normative) argument. This is useful for our purposes because
Wenger, as a result, thinks about questions such as the operationalization of
concepts, a methodological concern that was entirely alien to Bourdieu and
other more critically inclined theorists of practice in the twentieth century. To
illustrate the point, here are some of the indicators that Wenger thought helpful
for researchers to be able to identify the existence of communities of practice:
“sustained mutual relationships—harmonious or conflictual,” “substantial
overlap in participants’ descriptions of who belongs,” “the ability to assess the
appropriateness of actions and products,” “jargon and shortcuts to
communication as well as the ease of producing new ones,” and “a shared
239
discourse reflecting a certain perspective on the world.”
Though it is not essential, for our purposes, to know about the remaining
seven indicators developed by Wenger, a passing familiarity with the partial list
reproduced above is enlightening because it throws additional light on the kinds
of things that could become “data points” (to borrow the language of
positivism) in practice-based reasoning about international law. As such,
Wenger, intentionally or otherwise, offers more guidance on the practical
challenge of studying practices than some of his contemporaries. Relatedly,
given the vagueness—or, rather, the lack of concreteness—of most existing
conceptions of practice, the exemplary list of what might count as “the explicit”
and “the tacit” in Wenger’s aforementioned definition fills a void. For absent
concrete, empirical applications à la Bourdieu (think Distinction, his
doorstopper of a book), Wenger’s all-encompassing definition goes a long way
toward showing researchers interested in identifying, isolating, and interpreting
practices of international law to what types of evidence to be attuned in times of
240
practical immersion.
In this part of the article, I have placed practice theory in context, tracing its
development from Aristotle to the present. By acquainting readers with the
entire universe of practice theories, I have sought to present a menu of options
for the development of practice-oriented research designs in the area of
international law. The study of practices in international law could conceivably
proceed on the basis of any of these theoretical articulations of practice-based

238. These traditions are what he refers to as “theories of collectivity,” “theories of subjectivity,”
“theories of power,” and “theories of meaning.” WENGER, supra note 225, at 12–15.
239. Id. at 125–26.
240. I explain below, in part VI, why practical immersion in international law, as I conceive of it,
would ideally involve ethnographic immersion or, at a minimum, field research that approximates the
experience of participant observation.
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reasoning. In the next part, I continue the contextual analysis of practice theory
by examining its recent application in the domains of IR and of IL respectively.
V
THE HISTORY OF PRACTICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Taking a leaf from one or more of the aforementioned thinkers, IR and IL
scholars in the last decade began to look for practices in the international
system. In this part of the article, I engage with the existing scholarship, with
particular reference to select international practices. I elucidate both the
promise and limits of practice theory and conclude with a call for more finegrained research on organizational practices, which have largely, and for no
good reason at all, escaped the practice turn in IR.
A. Practices in International Relations
The gradually growing literature on international practices in IR largely
emerged out of the so-called linguistic turn in the humanities and social
sciences. As a result of the linguistic turn, discourse analysis moved front and
241
center in the interpretive study of international politics. It was often a method
of first resort for constructivists intent on emphasizing the constitutive role of
social meanings, whether they manifested themselves in the form of language,
242
identity, culture, or a combination thereof. The fact that the vast majority of
constructivist IR scholarship was, until very recently, not grounded in field
research, properly understood, contributed to the centrality of discourse
243
analysis in the interpretive study of international politics. Yet, as Neumann,
an early advocate for careful practice-based scholarship in IR, argued more
than a decade ago,
in IR we have to remind ourselves that the linguistic turn and the turn to discourse
analysis involved from the beginning a turn to practices. For IR this means the
linguistic turn is not just a turn to narrative discourse and rhetoric, but to how politics
is actually [a]ffected. The analysis of discourse understood as the study of the
preconditions for social action
must include the analysis of practice understood as the
244
study of social action itself.

More recently, Adler and Pouliot, as already mentioned, brought together a
number of scholars to think more systematically about select international

241. For a foundational and leading text, see NICHOLAS ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING: RULES
RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989). For a collection dedicated
to linguistic approaches to international politics, see INTERNATIONAL/INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS:
POSTMODERN READINGS OF WORLD POLITICS (James Der Derian & Michael J. Shapiro eds., 1998).
242. For a comprehensive review of pertinent scholarship from a discursive point of view, see
Jennifer Milliken, The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and
Methods, 5 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 225 (1999).
243. For an assessment of constructivist empirical research, see Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics, 4
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 391 (2001).
244. Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn, supra note 198, at 627–28.
AND
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245

practices. The focus of the assembled cast was, among others, on the World
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a “bundle of
246
interwoven practices” and the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS)
as a specific practice, all of which shed light on the logic of bargaining between
247
the international organization and its member states; on the practice, in the
context of international bargaining, of what the rational-choice theorist William
248
Riker called heresthetics, or political manipulation; and on the international
249
practice of security privatization.
The turn to international practices for this handful of IR scholars, positivist
and postpositivist alike, represents an alternative way of making sense of the
pursuit of power politics in all of its guises and in a radically altered
international system. Neumann, for one, by synthesizing insights from Hans
Morgenthau—the most important representative of classical realism in IR
theory—and Foucault, began to conceive of certain international practices as
quintessential instruments of power, insisting that
there does exist a rationality of government with matching principles that adds up to
government over governments. Sovereignty may remain as an ordering principle
among states, but the practices that constitute it are permeated not only with the
mode of power 250
that is sovereignty, but also with other modes of power, notably
governmentality.

He subsequently turned to studying the practice of diplomacy to help illuminate
the history of international practices. I will use this particular example of
international political practice to shed light on the promise—and limits—of IR’s
turn to practice theory.
1. The Practice of Diplomacy
Neumann’s application of practice theory is rather straightforward. His
emphasis is on the empirical, not the theoretical, study of everyday life in the
international system. In his attempt to make sense of diplomacy as “quotidian
policy-making,” as he calls it, Neumann starts from the premise that
international practices, generally speaking, are integrative (“they nudge social
agents into relationships”), reflective (“they relate to the actions of others”),
251
and performative (they are stylized). His work owes to a number of scholars
examined in my genealogy of theories of practice, notably to de Certeau,

245. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 40; see also Cornelia Navari, The Concept of Practice
in the English School, 17 REV. INT’L STUD. 611 (2010).
246. Ole J. Sending & Iver B. Neumann, Banking on Power: How Some Practices in an
International Organization Anchor Others, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 40, at 231, 232.
247. Id.
248. Erik Voeten, The Practice of Political Manipulation, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra
note 40, at 255.
249. Rita Abrahamsen & Michael C. Williams, Privatization in Practice: Power and Capital in the
Field of Global Security, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 40, at 310.
250. NEUMANN & SENDING, supra note 7, at 164–65.
251. Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn, supra note 198, at 637–38.
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although his reliance on the Frenchman is ultimately slight. This does not
mean, however, that Neumann’s contribution to the study of practices in the
international system is negligible. Quite the contrary: What sets his writings on
diplomacy apart from those of virtually everyone else in IR who is involved in
the study of international practices is their empirical depth. Unlike the vast
majority of constructivist (or otherwise critical) scholars with a pragmatic bent,
Neumann is not content with what he calls, as already noted, “armchair
253
analysis.”
Cognizant of constructivism’s weak empirical track record when it comes to
tracing and substantiating such processes as socialization, Neumann delved into
the everyday life of international politics. Wondering whether the seemingly
anachronistic world of diplomacy still mattered in the twenty-first century, he
set himself the task “to understand what diplomats and diplomacy do and what
254
they believe they are doing.” In order to find out what it means, and what it
255
takes, “to be a diplomat,” he chose to become one. Between 1997 and 1999,
and again from 2001 until 2003, he immersed himself in Norway’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, where he worked as a planner and later as senior adviser on
256
European politics. One impetus that persuaded him to join the diplomatic
corps was the realization that “very little seems to be known about the standard
operational procedures and everyday routines of diplomacy, even by many of
257
those who make their living as political insiders.” Yet if we believe Neumann,
“[i]t is the hands-on work of diplomats—their reports from abroad, their desk
analyses, their drawing of all this information into recommendations for state
policies and priorities—that make up the substance of what has for some 150
258
years been known as ‘foreign’ policy making.”
Across a series of publications, Neumann affords us a number of terrific
glimpses into the lifeworld of his onetime colleagues in the Norwegian foreignpolicy establishment. In keeping with the tenets of practice theory, broadly
defined, he singles out for interpretation a number of activities that he
considers to be constitutive of the practice of diplomacy, as experienced in
Norway. Among them are the more obvious activities of mediation and
negotiation as well as the kinds of activities that often remain hidden unless one
goes inside bureaucracy, namely the activities of self-administration, textual
259
production in general, and speech writing in particular. In his book, Neumann

252. Id. at 632–38 (commending de Certeau’s theory of action and his decision to treat practices,
and not just utterances, as discursive).
253. Id. at 628.
254. IVER B. NEUMANN, AT HOME WITH THE DIPLOMATS: INSIDE A EUROPEAN FOREIGN
MINISTRY 2 (2012) [hereinafter NEUMANN, AT HOME WITH THE DIPLOMATS].
255. See Iver B. Neumann, To Be a Diplomat, 6 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 72 (2005).
256. NEUMANN, AT HOME WITH THE DIPLOMATS, supra note 254, at ix.
257. Id. at 3.
258. Id.
259. See generally NEUMANN, AT HOME WITH THE DIPLOMATS, supra note 254. For a more
detailed account of the practice of speechwriting, see Iver B. Neumann, “A Speech That the Entire
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unpacks each of these activities at great length, relying extensively on
interviews and observations collected during his years as a participant observer.
On the basis of a comprehensive rendering of a particular European foreign
ministry, made around the turn of the millennium, Neumann shows that the
organizational culture that he found in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
260
Affairs is “highly ritualized” and self-perpetuating. He relates this in passing
to Foucault’s notion of governmentality, while also observing a
“diplomatization” of other spheres of international activity, a process that he
suggests will have a lasting effect on the practice of diplomacy in the twenty261
first century. But what exactly is significant, if anything, about Neumann’s
analysis? The question should be easy to answer, but is not: Neumann,
apparently on account of a general disillusionment with the conventions of
political science, largely fails to tie his findings together and relate his
ethnographic vignettes to a clearly articulated argument about the relationship
between diplomatic practice and international outcomes. The reader is left
wondering whether the analytical whole that Neumann created is worth more
than the sum of its parts.
Compared to Neumann’s closely observed (if sometimes meandering)
descriptions of diplomatic life in Norway, Ian Hurd’s application of practice
262
theory to the study of diplomacy is refreshingly parsimonious. He advances a
clearly articulated argument about the role of diplomacy in relation to
international law on the basis of a reasonable conceptualization of diplomatic
263
practice. On the downside, Hurd’s treatment has little to do with practice
theory as defined here. It is one thing to bring metatheory to the empirical
world by way of operationalization; it is quite another to elide theoretical
complexity and sidestep what many consider the methodological essence of
empirically motivated practice theory. For example, Hurd’s contention that
“[a]s a social practice, diplomacy has . . . three formal qualities: sociality,
264
statecentrism, and a productive effect,” although arguably useful in the
context of a conventional constructivist analysis of rules and norms in the
international system, betrays a misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of
practice theory, as outlined in some detail above. The point of practice-based
reasoning, in whatever theoretical incarnation, is to foreground activity, and,
even more important, to do so in a specific time, place, and concrete historical
context. The point is to get readers to understand, first and foremost, the
particularity of practices. Universalizing statements about the nature of
Ministry May Stand For,” or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New, 1 INT’L POL. SOC. 183
(2007).
260. NEUMANN, AT HOME WITH THE DIPLOMATS, supra note 254, at 188–89.
261. Id. at 182.
262. See Ian Hurd, Law and the Practice of Diplomacy, 66 INT’L J. 581 (2011) (advancing the twin
arguments that diplomacy is a social practice of states, and that this practice consists of reconciling state
behavior to international law).
263. See id. at 582–88.
264. Id. at 588.
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diplomacy run counter to the ethos of practice theory, which as we have seen, is
265
all about the discovery of social meanings. In the context of an analysis of the
practice of diplomacy, close attention should be paid to the doings and sayings
266
of practitioners in a localized setting of “the diplomat’s world.”
To be sure, my criticism here is not directed at the substance of Hurd’s
argument about diplomacy’s role in relation to international law, but rather to
his claim that the analysis has much to do with a practice-oriented way of
studying international politics. Hurd’s approach, although not dissimilar from
other recent work on international practices in IR, and although constructivist
in orientation, is (1) not inductive, but deductive, (2) not focused on the
patterned activities that comprise the practice of diplomacy in a specific setting,
and (3) not founded on any observational research on the “corporeal
knowledge” that is associated with doing. Hurd’s analysis stays at a fairly
general level of argumentation. We do not get a sense, as we certainly do from
Neumann due to his long-standing immersion in Norway, that diplomats are
more than automatons. In fact, contrary to what practice theory would require,
we learn nothing new about the meaning and logic of social action in relation to
diplomatic practice. States are presented as unitary actors, and diplomacy as a
phenomenon that is seemingly coherent across space and time.
Interestingly, Pouliot’s analysis of diplomacy’s practice in the context of
267
NATO’s security community suffers from similar flaws. Based on an empirical
analysis of the practical logics at work in the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in
the 1990s, Pouliot found that the dynamics of Russian–Atlantic diplomatic
relations in the post–Cold War world were not primarily driven by the
preexisting collective identities that had emerged on both sides in the four
decades prior, but far more so by daily cooperation “[o]n the ground of
international politics” between Russian and NATO security practitioners in
268
269
such venues as the NRC. Although “latent mistrust of mutual intentions,”
not to mention problems in the “larger political relationship between Moscow
270
and the West,” had a negative effect on the ease with which the Russian–
Atlantic relationship developed, Pouliot insists that practical knowledge is more
important an explanatory factor than any other in accounting for the initial
opening toward the Western alliance that was observable in Russia’s diplomatic
271
circles as well as for the limits of this rapprochement, notably at the moment
265. On the importance of context, conceptual and historical, in the study of diplomacy, see IVER
B. NEUMANN, DIPLOMATIC SITES: A CRITICAL ENQUIRY (2013).
266. For a macrohistorical overview of this world’s transformation, see Markus Mösslang &
Torsten Riotte, Introduction: The Diplomat’s World, in THE DIPLOMAT’S WORLD: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY, 1815–1914 (Markus Mösslang & Torsten Riotte eds., 2008).
267. See Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality, supra note 22, at 278–83. An empirically better
treatment is VINCENT POULIOT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN PRACTICE: THE POLITICS OF NATO–
RUSSIA DIPLOMACY (2010) [hereinafter POULIOT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN PRACTICE].
268. POULIOT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN PRACTICE, supra note 267, at 1.
269. Id. at 104.
270. Id. at 119.
271. See id. at 231.
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when NATO embarked on its policy of double enlargement. This latter policy
had the effect of complicating international security in practice and ultimately
reversing the nature of diplomatic relations between the Western alliance and
272
Russia from tentative cooperation back to outright confrontation. Leaving
aside the veracity of the empirical argument, which challenges much of the
conventional wisdom, Pouliot challenges a core assumption of constructivist
reasoning in IR, namely the claim that identities drive behavior:
[I]t is not only who we are that drives what we do; it is also what we do that determines
who we are. By starting with the concrete ways in which state representatives handle
disputes in and through practice, I reverse the traditional causal arrow of social
action—from ideas
to practice—and emphasize how practices also shape the world
273
and its meaning.

He has certainly done so, and his book illustrates well, in certain respects at
least, the explanatory power of a practice-based approach. But the book also
has limits.
Aside from the obvious criticism that the NRC was responsible for enacting
only a small slice of NATO–Russian diplomacy, it is surprising that Pouliot
reveals very little about the daily grind at the NRC. As one critic noted,
Pouliot might . . . have devoted more attention to the specific practices of the security
professionals he interviewed. His interviewees are identified in only the vaguest of
terms and there is relatively little discussion either of their day to day experiences or
of their precise role within the policy-making process. . . . Pouliot’s argument that
international security emerges “in and through practice” would be more persuasive
had he provided a detailed analysis of the precise role played by his “security
professionals” within the machinery of foreign and security policy-making. It is
conceivable that the way diplomatic and military officials at the coal face of
international relations represent issues and frame policy options plays a vital role in
shaping the parameters of high policy. To make this argument, however, requires a
carefully considered analysis of the various policy-making fields under consideration.
The book does not do this and the argument is less persuasive than it might have been
274
as a result.

Like Hurd, Pouliot is chiefly interested in the macrodimensions of
diplomacy rather than in the microdimensions thereof, which is unfortunate, for
as Neumann has shown, a lot can be gleaned about what it diplomacy is, and is
not, by working from the inside out. Although Pouliot conducted several dozen
interviews in capitals around the world, this is not quite the same as getting an
unvarnished look at the interior of the lifeworld of those with whom he is
concerned—diplomats. The point is an important one, of great methodological
significance, because, if we are serious about the study of practice, we must be
careful not to mistake representations of practice for the real thing. In this
context, one reviewer of Pouliot’s book made the important point that the
measured responses from NATO and Russian diplomats on the question of the
use of force that Pouliot takes as evidence of a diplomatic rapprochement may
272. See id. at 107–18.
273. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
274. Peter Jackson, Book Review, 2 H-DIPLO/ISSF, no. 5, 2011 at 14, 18–19, available at
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-2-5.pdf (internal citation ommited).
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not be as genuine as the latter thinks:
On one level, all of this could be interpreted as compelling evidence that the use of
force has indeed disappeared from the conceptual horizons of policy elites. Yet it
might also be argued that diplomats are always likely to give the kind of measured and
reassuring responses that Pouliot quotes. This is the way members of the diplomatic
profession are trained to express themselves (particularly to outsiders). There are
good reasons for this. Recourse to the language of force necessarily limits the scope
for negotiation and compromise. Introducing military considerations into discussions
of political relations, moreover, tends to increase the influence of soldiers at the
expense of diplomats. Stressing the potential of negotiations, conversely, protects the
space for diplomatic manoeuvre. The use of measured language and an emphasis on
the need for conversation is therefore a pivotal disposition in the habitus of the
professional diplomat. . . . [D]iplomatic professionals tend to avoid overt references to
the need for military options, not least because their influence tends to diminish
dramatically once this threshold has been crossed. Some consideration of this issue
275
might have added greater nuance to Pouliot’s analysis of his interview data.

A different way of putting this is to say that Pouliot might have benefitted from
complementing his conventional qualitative methodology of choice—
interviews—with a more unconventional one—namely participant observation.
Even if done sparingly, immersion trumps standing on the outside looking in,
especially if it is the daily work of diplomacy one hopes to study. With this
background in mind, Neumann’s genuinely ethnographic approach to studying
a most salient practice of international politics, and his concerted effort to
understand the many concrete (and often mundane) work activities at the heart
of diplomatic work, despite shortcomings, some of which I have detailed above,
has brought us considerably closer to what we can reasonably expect to achieve
from making practice theory usable for the study of the international system.
B. Practices in International Law
In the study of international law, practice theory has not yet left much of a
mark. Dezalay and Garth, as mentioned, have brought Bourdieu to the study of
international law, but the application of the sociologist’s oeuvre in their books
and articles revolved more around his field theory than his writings on practice.
This being so, the IL landscape is rather barren of practice-oriented analyses. It
is therefore worthwhile to consider an example of leading scholarship that has
singled out patterned activity for a practice-oriented analysis of international
law. An international practice upon which I rely to exemplify the promise—and
limits—of IL’s turn to practice theory is that of legality, as analyzed by the legal
scholar Jutta Brunnée and the political scientist Stephen Toope, whose book,
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, won the 2011 Certificate of Merit
of the American Society of International Law “for a preeminent contribution to
276
creative scholarship.” Next, I showcase important work on organizational

275. Id. at 18.
276. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010) (arguing—on the basis of a novel theoretical approach to
international law that integrates insights from the legal theory of Lon Fuller and constructivist
scholarship in IR—that the legitimacy of international law is a function of the international practice of
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practices, as I conceive of them, coming out of IL. Among the very few scholars
who have embarked on genuinely ethnographic work is Galit Sarfaty, who, in a
handful of publications, notably in her book Values in Translation: Human
Rights and the Culture of the World Bank, has unearthed, both comprehensively
and in a very specific context, important insights about the everyday practice of
277
human rights.
1. The Practice of Legality
As part of the aforementioned project on international practices, Brunnée
and Toope sought to come to terms with the phenomenon of legal obligation in
international law, which, on their account, requires us to move beyond
conventional reasoning in IL, especially in the context of global climate change
with which Brunnée and Toope are particularly concerned. As they write,
“[R]ather than simply treating state practice as behavioral regularities, or as the
day-to-day application of a pre-existing construct called ‘law,’ we posit that a
distinctive practice of legality is required for law, and legal obligation, to exist
278
and to be sustained over time.” In order to answer the question of why states
obey international law, maintain Brunnée and Toope, scholars ought to pursue
a technical analysis of formal sources of international law alongside an
interpretive analysis of the interactions between and among states that make,
remake, or unmake international law. On their argument, “[t]he hard work of
international law is never done—legal obligation must be built and continuously
279
reinforced by communities of legal practice.”
The term “communities of practice,” as we have seen, is Etienne Wenger’s.
Brunnée and Toope do not spend much time operationalizing the concept for
their purpose. In fact, their analysis of the international practice of legality is
more conventionally constructivist in focus than practice-oriented. Drawing on
the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller, notably his work on the so-called inner
morality of law, they argue that governments’ sustained adherence, in their
280
international legal dealings, to Fuller’s criteria of legality, will persuade those
governments to habitually obey international law:
Fidelity is generated and, in our terminology obligation is felt, because adherence to
the eight criteria of legality in the creation of norms and in their continuing
application (a ‘practice of legality’) produce law that is legitimate in the eyes of the
persons to whom it is addressed. Legal obligation, then, is best viewed as an
internalized commitment and not as an externally imposed duty matched with a

legality).
277. GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE
WORLD BANK (2012).
278. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Interactional International Law and the Practice of
Legality, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 40, at 108, 109 [hereinafter Brunnée & Toope,
Interactional International Law and the Practice of Legality]. For a more comprehensive treatment, see
BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 276.
279. Brunnée & Toope, Interactional International Law and the Practice of Legality, supra note 278,
at 110.
280. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1969).
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The internalized commitment is created and maintained by the continued
performance of shared understandings of what constitutes appropriate legal
norms and institutions, internationally and otherwise.
On this foundation, Brunnée and Toope advance the interesting claim that
“it is possible for communities of legal practice to emerge in the absence of
strongly shared substantive values, on the basis only of a shared commitment to
282
the enterprise of legal interaction.” I find this theoretical argument eminently
plausible, not least because I advanced a very similar claim—though without
reference to practice theory—about the institutional effects of legality in a
283
domestic context. This notwithstanding, I think conspicuously lacking from
the analysis is an explicit engagement—both theoretical and empirical—with
the concrete patterned activities that constitute the practice of legality. The
authors lean too much on their “interactional law framework,” which, though
innovative, leaves the reader wanting to hear more about the everyday life of
legality in international law than about the broad-strokes argument that fidelity
to international law is contingent on reciprocity, which, in turn, “is created and
284
maintained collectively through continuing practice.” Put differently, the
account offered by Brunnée and Toope is insufficiently specific about the
mechanisms and processes of community building, that is, about what exactly is
involved when legality is being practiced in the international system.
Therefore, inasmuch as the theoretical argument, rooted in an application of
Fulller’s procedural concept of law to the international stage, is compelling, its
incorporation of practice theory is less convincing. Although the empirical
285
analysis of the global climate regime, which they undertake in both the book
and the chapter at issue here, is illuminating, it is more conventionally
constructivist in nature than reminiscent of a sophisticated analysis of practice.
They show, though not exhaustively, that the strong procedural elements of the
recurring climate-change negotiations, combined with a steady supply of lawminded government representatives, “has helped generate a sense of
commitment of the participants to the climate regime and accounts at least in
286
part for its resilience.” Although this may be so, a genuinely practice-based
analysis would have pushed harder to acquaint us in substantially more detail
with the everyday life of legality’s practice in Kyoto, Copenhagen, and the
281. Brunnée & Toope, Interactional International Law and the Practice of Legality, supra note 278,
at 115.
282. Id. at 113.
283. See MEIERHENRICH, supra note 99 (advancing an argument about the long-run consequences
of law in South Africa, according to which continuous and concurrent practices of legality by
contending adversaries over a period of 350 years contributed to the emergence of law as common
knowledge, thereby crucially attenuating commitment problems in the transition from apartheid to
democracy).
284. Brunnée & Toope, Interactional International Law and the Practice of Legality, supra note 278,
at 116.
285. See id. at 123.
286. Id. at 127.
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many other sites of international bargaining. For as we have seen, practice
theorists, regardless of theoretical persuasion, foreground the importance of
activity, performance, and work in the creation of social phenomena. This
attention to the minutiae of legality’s practice in the international system is,
unfortunately, missing from Brunnée and Toope’s work. It could be relatively
easily incorporated, however, especially if the authors embarked on
observational research in the world of international environmental law. Such a
turn to up-close and personal inquiry inside some of the domestic and
international institutions that comprise the international environmental regime
would enable scholars to know with more certainty how legal ideas truly move
in the international system. It would allow for a more careful—and concrete—
287
tracing of the mechanisms involved in the socialization of states. For as IR
scholars such as Alastair Iain Johnston have pointed out, we still know very
288
little about the microfoundations of socialization in the international system.
What remains interesting about Brunnée and Toope’s application, if
imperfect, of practice theory to an important topic in the study of international
law—legal obligation—is their contribution to our understanding of a
perennially challenging construct of public international law, namely the
concept of opinio juris, famously defined by the International Court of Justice
as the “belief that [a] practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
289
of law requiring it.” Though their method and argument can be challenged in
multiple ways, what they do indeed provide is, as they put it, “a more objective,
290
less mystical, account of how customary legal norms become binding.” By
offering a constructivist—rather than rationalist—perspective on legal
obligation, Brunnée and Toope give more substantive meaning to the
international legal requirement of opinio juris. They do so by providing a
theoretically plausible and empirically verifiable account of how, and why,
states may feel the pull of international law qua law. By linking legal obligation
to the identity of states, not just their interests, as well as to the institutions of
international life, Brunnée and Toope manage to render less mysterious the
concept of opinio juris and its operation in international law. If practice theory,
even without field research, has the ability to help us illuminate the empirical
(as opposed to the doctrinal) logic of one of the principal tenets of international
law, it is not unreasonable to expect that a fair amount could be gained by
applying insights from any of the many theories of practice also to other
international legal questions of importance.

287. On the topic of socialization in international law more generally, see, most recently, RYAN
GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013), which turns their previous published articles on the topic into an
integrated and updated “theory of influence.”
288. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT’L
STUD. Q. 487, 488 (2001).
289. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
290. Brunnée & Toope, Interactional International Law and the Practice of Legality, supra note 278,
at 121.
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2. The Practice of Human Rights
As already mentioned, Sarfaty has made a valuable contribution to
understanding the practical dimensions of international law by way of her indepth treatment of one important collective actor in this realm—the World
Bank. Relevant to IL scholarship on international law, the international
financial institution in Washington, D.C. proves an ideal setting in which to
explore what I have elsewhere called the logic of legal contention. Sarfaty
initially demonstrates that, and why, human rights are of marginal significance
in the daily work of the World Bank. That finding, however, at the aggregate
level at least, is neither surprising nor new. Far more important then is Sarfaty’s
account of the various mechanisms and processes by which human rights have
been marginalized at the World Bank, and the temporal dimension of what
Sarfaty says amounts to a cultural logic of marginalization. As she puts it,
I demonstrate that human rights has been a taboo topic within parts of the institution,
but the type and extent of the taboo has changed over time and in different contexts.
Moreover, when the concept of human rights has been incorporated into
Bank
291
discourses and practices, it has often been in a partial or inconsistent manner.

Studying shifting patterns of marginalization and changes in type and extent is
not easy. It is a sensitive, time-consuming, and methodologically challenging
proposition for any researcher. A practice-based approach is well-suited to the
task because it foregrounds the importance of interpreting work activity, of
doing. Though she does not ground herself theoretically or methodologically in
any theory of practice, Sarfaty comes close to embodying the approach in her
work on the World Bank.
Intrigued by the question of why the World Bank, despite the increased
salience of human-rights concerns on the part of other international
organizations involved in poverty reduction and fostering development—from
the United Nations Development Programme to the United Nations Children’s
Fund—has not adopted a deliberate and integrated human-rights strategy,
Sarfaty began to look for answers in IL scholarship. To her chagrin, “[t]his
literature primarily focuses on legal arguments for binding the Bank and its
member countries to international human rights obligations. It does not
investigate the internal workings of the bureaucracy so as to understand why
292
the Bank has yet to adopt and internalize human rights norms.” Sarfaty’s
dissatisfaction with IL scholarship mirrors my own: The conventional and
widespread disregard in the discipline for studying the microfoundations of IL
developments has had the unfortunate effect of rendering international legal
scholarship unable to address—theoretically, methodologically, and
empirically—the question that Sarfaty posed: Why is the World Bank not
serious about human rights?
291. Galit A. Sarfaty, Measuring Justice: Internal Conflict over the World Bank’s Empirical
Approch to Human Rights, in MIRRORS OF JUSTICE: LAW AND POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
132 (Kamari Maxine Clarke & Mark Goodale eds., 2010).
292. Galit A. Sarfaty, Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human
Rights at the World Bank, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 647, 649 (2009).
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Although it is not inaccurate to suggest that “the” World Bank is not serious
about human rights, this statement conceals more than it reveals. For Sarfaty’s
research makes plain that a number of committed World Bank employees have
been pushing the human-rights agenda inside the organization for almost two
decades, ever since James Wolfensohn became president of the Bank in 1995,
and with particular vigor from 2002 onward, following the creation of an
organization-wide task force on human rights. However, without going into
much detail, these high-level initiatives achieved little. Human rights are hardly
less marginal now than before Wolfensohn’s tenure. Conventional IL
scholarship is unable to explain this rather unexpected outcome. After all, as we
have seen, other international organizations appear to have embraced, even
internalized, legal human-rights norms and institutions. If we believe Sarfaty,
the only way to understand the “marginality,” as she terms it, of human rights at
the World Bank is to stop treating the Washington-based bureaucracy as if it
were a unitary actor. Similarly to the proposals I have articulated in this article,
Sarfaty believes in the importance of opening the “black box” of international
organizations, be they international financial institutions or international
criminal courts and tribunals:
I have found that the ways norms become adopted and ultimately internalized in an
institution largely depend on their fit with the organizational culture. When a new
norm is introduced, employees from different professional groups within the Bank
often have distinct interpretive frames that they use to define the norm, analyze its
relevance to the Bank’s mission, and apply it in practice. Proponents of a norm must
take internal conflict over competing frames into account when trying to persuade
staff members to accept it. They must also consider the operational procedures,
incentive system, and management structure of the organization when determining the
most effective strategy of implementation. Thus, to bring about internalization, actors
must adapt norms to local meanings
and existing cultural values and practices—that is,
293
they must “vernacularize” norms.

Sarfaty knows all of this because practice theorists, especially those who
have been studying organizational dynamics, have been saying as much for
years. But then again Sarfaty also knows her way around the World Bank
because of her ethnographic immersion there. In addition to knowing things
about bureaucracy in general, she saw fit to learn something about bureaucracy
in particular, and to do so concretely, as a participant observer. It is this
experience, the partaking in the everyday life of the World Bank, that has
sensitized her to the peculiar logic of contentious politics surrounding the
persistent nonadoption of human-rights norms over the course of two decades.
Absent this, she would neither have been privy to, nor recognized the causal
significance of, the “battles between Bank lawyers and economists over
294
defining human rights norms.” For it turns out that, more than anything, it
was “a clash of expertise,” coupled with irreconcilable ways of seeing the world,
that caused—and allowed—economists to outmaneuver the comparatively
small number of lawyers intent on reconfiguring World Bank strategy. As
293. Id. at 649.
294. Id. at 650.
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Sarfaty writes, “The dominant subculture within the organization consists of
economists because their expertise is considered the most valuable to the
295
Bank’s core work of promoting poverty reduction and economic growth.”
Economists, in other words, were victorious when it came to marginalizing
human rights at the World Bank because the organizational culture of the
international financial institution considers arguments from international law to
be alien to the practice of international development as understood at the
World Bank. Lawyers, one might say, have been treated as “the other” at the
World Bank.
Needless to say, the story that Sarfaty tells is more nuanced and worth
reading in full. More relevant for the purpose of this article than her substantive
findings, however, is her participation in, and close reading of, all kinds of daily
goings-on inside the World Bank bureaucracy. It is worth including verbatim
her summary of the methodological approach that she took in researching the
social meanings of human rights at the World Bank not only because her
approach is broadly in line with my guidelines for studying the practice of
international law, which I elaborate in part VI, but also because the description
she offers might aid future researchers in deciding whether or not deeply
interpretive field research on the practice of international law is feasible for
them—whether financially, intellectually, or in terms of the substantial time
commitment that is required. Here, then, is Sarfaty with details about her
ethnographic study of the World Bank:
As part of the research for my doctoral dissertation in anthropology, I worked and
conducted fieldwork at the Bank’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., for
approximately two years over a period of four years, from 2002 to 2006. During the
summers of 2002 and 2004, I served as a consultant and intern in the Legal
Department and the Social Development and Environment Departments of the Latin
America and Caribbean Region. My two summers as an intern afforded me the trust
to gain access for a full year of fieldwork, from September 2005 until July 2006. . . . My
methods included interviews with more than seventy staff members (from project
manager to a former president), executive directors, U.S. Treasury officials, and NGO
representatives; participation at Bank training sessions and seminars; and analyses of
Bank projects and documents. . . . Conducting ethnographic research on the Bank
enabled me to uncover the formal and informal norms and the decision-making
processes within the institution that shape state behavior. I examined the institution
from both the top down and the bottom up, focusing not only on its leadership and
administrative structure, but also on the tasks and incentives of the staff. I analyzed
the informal practices and unspoken assumptions held by employees that may be
misinterpreted by or hidden from external observers, as well as the employees
themselves. The application of these techniques reveals the competing subcultures and
296
other internal contestations that may impede norm internalization.

The duration of Sarfaty’s ethnographic immersion at the World Bank was in
keeping with professional anthropological standards. From the vantage point of
IL and IR, where ethnographic research is the exception, her time spent
working alongside the World Bank’s economists and lawyers looks even more
impressive. However, given the dearth of analytical—rather than merely
295. Id. at 673.
296. Id. at 652.
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descriptive—accounts of international legal settings, any carefully planned
immersion will likely contribute to our knowledge about how international law
works in practice. Not every excursion into the field to make sense of the
everyday life of international law need necessarily last years, as Sarfaty’s did.
Much can be gleaned, especially by an experienced field researcher, from
considerably shorter stints inside the many bureaucracies attending, in whole or
in part, to questions of international law. The only thing that could have
improved Sarfaty’s otherwise flawless research design is a theoretical
engagement not only with the sizable literature on socialization, which she
touches upon in passing, but with one or more of the many theories of practice
that can be made usable for the study of international law, at the World Bank
and elsewhere.
So much for the practice of human rights as an organizational practice. Of
course, the practice of human rights can also be fruitfully studied as an
international practice, by which I mean a practice that is not primarily enacted
inside one bureaucratic entity, but rather on the stage of the international
system as a whole, with a multitude of international agents playing a role—from
individuals to NGOs to states to international organizations. The sociologist
Fuyuki Kurasawa, for example, recently relied on insights from practice theory
to understand the “social labor” involved in the making of five transnational
forms of advocacy in pursuit of human rights—namely, bearing witness,
297
forgiveness, foresight, aid, and solidarity. On Kurasawa’s argument, these five
international practices are jointly constitutive of what he calls the work of
global justice, by which he means the entire universe of struggles on behalf of
progressive goals, from the campaign to end of poverty to the fight against
impunity. Global justice is theorized as a “constellation of practices,” held
together by social glue made from intersubjectivity, publicity, and
298
transnationalism. Kurasawa’s analytical goal is to specify the everyday “work”
that the task of “realizing utopia,” to borrow a phrase from the late Antonio
299
Cassese, requires. Kurasawa asks readers to appreciate the limits of purely
formalist understandings of human rights—which dominate the field of IL—and
to embrace in their stead
a substantive conception of human rights, whereby the latter function as more than
ontological attributes which we enjoy as members of humankind or entitlements that
are legislated on our behalf by states or international organizations; they are, just as
significantly, capacities that groups300and persons produce, activate and must exercise
by pursuing ethico-political labour.

The work of global justice, finds Kurosawa, is “perpetually difficult, even

297. FUYUKI KURASAWA, THE WORK OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AS PRACTICES 16–
17 (2007).
298. Id. at 18.
299. See generally REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2012).
300. KURASAWA, supra note 297, at 14.
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301

flawed and aporetic.” Because most human-rights practitioners would readily
agree, what does practice theory have to offer that we do not already know?
A practice-based analysis of human rights, properly understood, has the
advantage of transcending mere description. Rather than elevating anecdote to
the level of fact, locally situated analyses of human-rights work, when grounded
in eye-level research, make visible previously unknown connections as well as
pathways of both power and pathology. This is possible because modes of
practice are “the lynchpins of the work of global justice, the points of contact,
transmission and mutual influence between national and global institutions
(transnational corporations, states, international organizations, etc.), at one
level, and civil society struggles (protests, public claims and campaigns,
302
demands for prosecution, etc.), at the other.”
Although Kurosawa’s
scholarship is undergirded, rather problematically from an analytical
perspective, with a normative belief in the desirability of all work on behalf of
global justice, he does succeed in looking at human rights not in the abstract but
303
in everyday life.
This brief review of a number of representative, if eclectic, contributions to
the existing literature on practices in IR and IL was designed to convey three
things: (1) practice-oriented scholarship on developments in the international
system is gradually growing, (2) the exploration of all kinds of topics of
international significance can potentially benefit from practice-based reasoning,
and (3) several research designs in IR and IL claiming to be practice-based are
less theoretically sophisticated, methodologically rigorous, and empirically
grounded than one would expect based on the intellectual foundations on which
they were erected.
VI
METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE STUDY OF PRACTICES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Having explored in some depth the theory and history of practices, I am
now in a position to draw on this intellectual tradition to develop guidelines for
the relational study of international law. By making insights about the logic of
practices usable for the study of international criminal law in particular, I hope
to provide an impetus for more rigorously descriptive work in international law,
by which I mean theoretically driven interpretive work that is firmly grounded
304
in really existing locations of international law. To the extent that I have
301. Id. at 15.
302. Id. at 197.
303. As evidence of Kurosawa’s normative belief, and thus of his potentially diminished capacity
for analytical judgment, consider this statement, one of many in defense of his particular brand of
cosmopolitanism: “[T]he performance of modes of practice of global justice would help to foster an
alternative world order based on principles of participatory democracy and oversight, as well as a major
North–South and domestic redistribution of symbolic and material resources.” Id. at 198.
304. On the question of “locations” in field research, see ANTHROPOLOGICAL LOCATIONS:
BOUNDARIES AND GROUNDS OF A FIELD SCIENCE (Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson eds., 1997)
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emphasized in this article the importance of detecting the social meaning(s) of
international law, mine is ultimately an argument for integrating aspects of
rationalism and doctrinalism and interpretivism in the study of international
legal phenomena. It goes without saying that many agents acting on the world
of international law will on many occasions make decisions in response to a
calculation of means and ends. It is also fairly obvious, at least to anyone who
knows the practice of international law from the inside, that the norms and
values undergirding international legal doctrine constitute behavior. Yet only
by closely observing goings-on in really existing locations of international law
do we stand to gain a “sobjectivist” sense of the nature and salience of the lawcrafts, what I have begun to theorize in this article as the practice of
international law. On my argument, the reality of international law is not
represented, at least not fully, by the macroprocesses of international legal
transactions (as in the doctrine of “state practice”). Nor is it fully captured by
instrumentalist accounts of microprocesses. Rather, the ontological essence of
international law reveals itself only if, and when, we integrate knowledge about
both the representational and nonrepresentational aspects of this vexing of
international phenomena. For as I have argued elsewhere, international law,
305
like international politics, is what actors make of it.
Accordingly, in this part of the article I am concerned with the future of
practice-based research on international law. I make a particular case for the
interpretive study of practices in international law. Needless to say, the
interpretive pursuit thereof is but one of several ways to advance the study of
practices in international law. As Stern reminds us, “Taking practices as a point
of departure does not require a commitment to any particular method, or any
306
specific destination.” I single out interpretive methodology because it is so
rarely adopted in the study of international law yet uniquely suited to help
researchers meet the two minimum requirements of all practice-oriented work
discussed above: a commitment to holism about meaning and the willingness to
pay close attention to particular practices and the specific contexts in which
they are performed. The methodology is particularly helpful for the study of the
ICC and comparable international organizations.
My discussion revolves around concrete strategies of inquiry that promise to
improve the identification, investigation, and interpretation of practices. Before
I turn to my methodological prescriptions, it is useful to briefly differentiate the
logic of practices from the two other major logics of social action, namely the

(proposing “a reformulation of the anthropological fieldwork tradition that would decenter and
defetishize the concept of ‘the field,’ while developing methodological and epistemological strategies
that foreground questions of location, intervention, and the construction of situated knowledges”).
305. Jens Meierhenrich, International Law Is What States Make of It, Paper Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (April 3, 2013) (on file with author); see also
Jens Meierhenrich, Explaining and Understanding Compliance with International Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffmann eds.,
forthcoming 2014).
306. Stern, supra note 34, at 186.
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so-called logic of consequences and what is known as the logic of
appropriateness. Figure 1 offers a depiction of these logics, which, per the visual
rendering, should be thought of in real life as interdependent, though usually
are not. Any serious student of the social sciences will be intimately familiar
with the latter two perspectives on why agents, individual or collective, choose
to act on the world. First explicitly theorized in 1989 by James March and Johan
Olsen, the logic of consequences, on the one hand, and the logic of
appropriateness, on the other, draw attention to two rival accounts of the
307
determinants of choices about action.
Arguments from the logic of
consequences, regardless of the substantive question or topic at hand, posit that
agents opt to behave in a particular way in response to the expected
consequences of their actions, which they calculate prior to taking action. On
this logic, social behavior is driven, first and foremost, by considerations about
means and ends. Rationality and interests are taken to be central motivating
factors. Arguments from the logic of appropriateness, by contrast, hold that
agents act in response to very different stimuli. The stimuli are often expressed
in terms of the social force of obligation. On this second logic, social behavior is
driven, first and foremost, by considerations about norms and values. Emotion
and identity are thought to be the principal motivating factors. In IR and IL
scholarship, arguments from the logic of consequences are widespread in
rationalist explanations of international phenomena. Arguments from the logic
of appropriateness are commonplace in constructivist scholarship.
Figure 1: The Logics of Social Action

As I have explained throughout this article, the logic of practices, regardless
of its specific theoretical articulation, departs radically and fundamentally from
307. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989).For an application to the international system, see
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52
INT’L ORG. 943 (1998).
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both of the aforementioned logics of social action.
The logic of practice jettisons the idea that agents take decisions, or can be treated ‘as
if’ they take decisions, in such a reflexive, logical, and analytical way. . . . This practicebased logic of action is offered to compliment, rather than to replace, existing theories,
which hold 308
that agents engage in conscious deliberation about consequences and/or
obligations.

Given this significance of practice theory—as a unique methodology that seeks
to come to terms with an increasingly popular way of seeing the world—the
interpretive turn that I am hoping to help advance with this article is opportune
for the study of international law. Whereas the logic of expected consequences
leads us to derive actions from preferences and the logic of appropriateness
leads us to derive actions from identities, the logic of practices—although
analytically mindful of the roles of both rationality and emotion—tells us to
start our account of actions with actions, the assumption being that the
unselfconscious doings of specific individuals in “particular circumstances”
(Aristotle’s concept) are not always reducible to either preferences or identities
309
and may even be ontologically prior to both.
I should note, in an aside, that Pouliot, like many other IR theorists drawing
310
on Thomas Risse’s argument to this effect,
includes the logic of
311
communicative action as a fourth logic of social action. I depart from this
depiction, sticking with a tripartite distinction. I propose that communicative
action, depending on its empirical manifestation, usually combines elements
from each of the three logics of social action. I would make a similar claim for
the “logic of habit” that Ted Hopf endeavored to distinguish from the logic of
312
practices. Inasmuch as I find important and convincing Hopf’s conceptual
distinction between habits and practices, I am not persuaded that the two forms
of behavior represent two fundamentally different logics of social action. It
seems to me that both are part and parcel of an understanding of social action
rooted in the “automatic system” of the brain, that is, in the unreflective nether
313
regions of being. Or, as Bourdieu put it, individuals who embody practices do
314
so “without entering consciousness except in an intermittent and partial way.”
If we accept this to be so, it does not make sense to conceive of habits and
practices as contending logics of social action but rather as two sides of the
same behavioral coin—namely as more (in the case of practices) or less (in the
case of habits) agentic forms of nonreflective participation in social life,
308. David Jason Karp, The Location of International Practices: What Is Human Rights Practice?,
39 REV. INT’L STUD. 969, 974 (2013).
309. ARISTOTLE, supra note 122, at l. 1141b.
310. See generally Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L
ORG. 1 (2000).
311. Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality, supra note 22, at 276.
312. Ted Hopf, The Logic of Habit in International Relations, 16 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 539, 541 (2010).
313. The formulation of the “automatic system” of the brain is Hopf’s, the antonym in his account
of the “reflective system” of the brain, which, he contends, governs social action motivated by the logics
of consequences, appropriateness, and practice. See id. at 541.
314. BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 269–70.
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whether local, national, or international in character. Be that as it may, how
should students of international law study practices if they feel so inclined?
Taking a leaf from Flyvbjerg who, over a decade ago, devoted his career to
315
“making social science matter,” as he put it, I advance five concrete guidelines
for studying practices in international law in a theoretically meaningful way. I
propose that any practice-oriented researcher with serious empirical ambitions
ought to (1) overcome distance, (2) locate reality, (3) identify activity, (4) reveal
meaning, and (5) investigate context.
A. Overcome Distance
This first methodological guideline, as straightforward as it is, is perhaps the
hardest to follow. Any scholar of international law who is seriously interested in
understanding how international law works in practice (as opposed to merely in
theory) ought to leave his or her office once in a while and take a look—up,
close, and personally—at what goes on in the many different international
courts, government ministries, organizations, law firms, and other settings in
which scores of individuals participate on a daily basis in, among other things,
the making, breaking, and honoring of international law. All kinds of
immersion scenarios are conceivable, from extended internships, to clerkships,
to sabbaticals. Oftentimes what we find at the microlevel in such settings may
accord in broad outline with what we or others have theorized at the
macrolevel. At other times, however—and this is certainly true of what my
research over the last few years on the ICC has shown—the existing literature
on international law has but a partial, incomplete, and even distorted sense of
the everyday life of international law. Even where this is not the case, a focus
on the micropolitics of international law will, at a minimum, generate more
fine-grained empirical observations than can be collected from hundreds or
thousands of miles away or by way of what, not infrequently, are crude
316
quantitative indicators.
What is more, by overcoming the distance, both literally and figuratively,
between ourselves and the sites of international law that we study, the potential
for more sophisticated (in terms of rendering more complexity visible rather
than less) scholarship increases. The academic analyses that result may be
considerably messier and less parsimonious than some social scientists desire,
but it stands to reason that scholarship founded on, or at least informed by, a
genuine immersion in the world of international law, and a self-conscious
engagement with its practitioners, has the potential of making the study of
international law matter more than it otherwise would. By bringing everyday

315. See FLYVBJERG, supra note 126, at 129–40 (crafting “Methodological Guidelines for a
Reformed Social Science”).
316. For pioneering work on the limitations of measurement in the study of international legal
phenomena, with particular reference to the practical implications of data-driven governance, see
GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS (Kevin
Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2012).
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agents of international law, and their lifeworlds, concretely into view, the
interpretive study of international legal practices opens up a black box that
scholars have peered into far too infrequently. Indeed, the reduction of
distance, my first methodological guideline, is likely a sine qua non of any
sustainable bridge-building between the “law-crafts” and those who study them
from inside their university offices, whether they are IL or IR scholars or in
317
another discipline entirely.
B. Locate Reality
Overcoming distance alone, however, is not enough in the study of practices
in international law. Mere participant observation, without analytical training
and ingenuity or a carefully rendered research design, will not result in
advanced scholarship on international law. It is important to know where to
look. For practices, as Nicolini writes, “cannot be understood without reference
318
to a specific place, time, and concrete historical context.” In short, it is
important to locate the reality of international law. This slightly vague
formulation is meant to highlight the importance of carefully reflecting on site
selection, that is, choosing the research setting most likely to be analytically
useful for an extended immersion in the name of interpretive research on a
given research question pertaining to international law. Although the operation
of international law can be closely observed in hundreds of settings, not all
locations are equally valuable from an analytical standpoint. This being so,
sound interpretive research on practices in international law requires a lot of
preparatory work. Because ethnographic research is time and resource
intensive, it demands a solid understanding, prior to the beginning of principal
field research, of where an extended immersion promises to generate the
highest observational payoffs. This requires a good preliminary sense of where
the international legal action is, or where the reality to be understood can be
observed most fully.
A practice-oriented approach will often benefit from decentering. A
decentered perspective to the study of international law can either involve the
selection of an analytically interesting and unusual site or the application of an
unusual theoretical approach to a prominent site. Either way, the chosen site
must also be capable of producing a sufficient number of observable—and
relevant—processes related to the substantive question about international
legal practices that is at stake in the research design. Not every closely observed
study of international law’s practice will be automatically worthwhile. It will be
compelling only to the extent that it is revealing of new or unexpected insights
about the international legal order. It is for this reason that any practiceoriented researcher of international law should come with a preliminary sense
317. In recent years anthropologists have begun to discover the study of international law.
Unfortunately, and surprisingly, most of the existing anthropological literature is insufficiently
empirical, by which I mean founded on participant observation.
318. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 214.
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of where the reality of international law can best be studied in her area of
specialization. This in turn demands a fairly sophisticated grasp of operational
knowledge so as to avoid spending time and effort immersed in an
analytically—because practically—marginal research site. Usually, the kind of
operational wherewithal that I am speaking of is impossible to acquire from
secondary scholarship on international law, the majority of which does not, as
mentioned, concern itself with the kinds of textured analyses on which
empirically driven and theoretically grounded practice accounts of international
legal processes can thrive.
C. Identify Activity
In addition to locating reality, the study of practices in international law
requires a researcher to single out analytically significant work activity. In this
pursuit it is essential to appreciate that practices
are not objects, they are not in the heads of people, and they are not stored in routines
or programmes. Practices only exist to the extent that they are enacted and reenacted. Focusing on practices is thus taking the social and material
doing (of
319
something: doing is never objectless) as the main focus of the inquiry.

It follows that the identification of activity for the purpose of observation and
interpretation is an integral methodological task for the study of practices in
international law. Generally speaking, the ensembles of patterned activities that
constitute practices can come in very different shapes and sizes, which is what
makes the interpretive task of identification so important. “These activities may
be intentional or unintentional, interpersonally cooperative or antagonistic, but
they are inherently multifaceted, woven of cognitive, emotional, semiotic,
appreciative, normative, and material components, which carry different
320
valences in different contexts.”
I use the term “activity” in order to draw attention to the ontological
relationship between actions and practices which different theories render very
differently. Rationalist theories, as Schatzki reminds us, “accord priority to
action, tying the identity of particular actions to properties of the individuals
who perform them (e.g., goals, intentions, and other mental states), and treat
321
practices as contingent agglomerations of already constituted actions.”
Practice theories, by contrast, treat practices as ontologically prior to actions:
“Whereas on practice accounts the actions that comprise a practice are
governed essentially by something in common, those comprising social
phenomena on individualist analyses are governed by the conjunction of the
relevant, only circumstantially identical or interwoven properties of
322
individuals.” The challenge for the field researcher (as well as for practice-

319. Id. at 219–21.
320. Charles Camic, Neil Gross & Michèle Lamont, Introduction: The Study of Social Knowledge
Making, in SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING 1, 7 (Charles Camic et al. eds., 2011).
321. Schatzki, Practices and Actions, supra note 215, at 286.
322. Id.
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oriented scholars not inclined to undertake primary research), then, is not only
to identify legally relevant activities but also to figure out whether they are
merely actions or whether they combine to form something more socially
meaningful.
In making this determination, all practice theorists give pride of place to
bodily comportment. Homo practicus is understood as both a carrier and
performer of practices. When looking for activity worthy of interpretation, a
great deal of attention must therefore be placed on the skills involved in a
practice. “From a practice perspective, knowledge is conceived largely as a form
of mastery that is expressed in the capacity to carry out a social and material
323
activity.” For example, in the case of international adjudication, a practice
that can be easily disaggregated in terms of its performative logic is that of
representing international law in the courtroom. But performances are also at
work at a less obvious level; they attach to all kinds of practices. As Nicolini
notes,
All practice theories . . . leave space for initiative, creativity, and individual
performance. These are in fact necessary, as performing a practice always requires
adapting to new circumstances so that practising is neither mindless repetition nor
complete invention. Yet individual
performances take place and are intelligible only
324
as part of an ongoing practice.

The upshot of this discussion is that researchers, when looking to make
visible practices of international law, should think of activity in a
nonconventional way. Describing ad nauseam international legal activity will
not suffice. This is not what the application of practice theory to international
law demands. Nicolini puts it aptly:
The mere ‘a-theoretical’ cataloguing of what practitioners do may be an exciting
endeavour for academics who are unfamiliar with the specific occupation, but it sheds
little light on the meaning of the work that goes into it, what makes it possible, why it
is the way it is, and how it contributes to, or interferes with, the production of
organizational life. In other words, listing and enumerating practices by taking them at
face-value constitutes a weak approach to practice. Such a descriptive and atheoretical way of addressing practice, which builds on the misleading assumption that
practice is self-explanatory, is scarcely capable of providing [any analytically useful
insights]. It is also likely to be conductive to a form of social science that is scarcely
relevant, as once the excitement and surprise of learning about an exotic
occupation
325
wears out, we are left with a ‘so what’ question, as are the practitioners.

In other words, when identifying activities, researchers would be welladvised to adopt a self-consciously analytical stance. As one theorist writes,
It is always necessary to ask what disposes people to enact the practices they do, how
and when they do; and their aims, their lived experience and their inherited
knowledge will surely figure amongst the factors of interest here. But it is not just a
matter of asking what contingencies incline people to enact, or not to enact, practices,
as if they exist like tools in a toolbox and it is merely a matter of explaining when and
why one or another is picked out. The relationship of practices and people is far more

323. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 5.
324. Id. at 4–5.
325. Id. at 13.
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326

This brings us to the methodological imperative to reveal meaning in the study
of practices.
D. Reveal Meaning
The “study of work as it happens”—Barbara Czarniawska’s evocative label
327
for practice theory—revolves centrally around a search for social meanings.
As one scholar writes, “the identity of a practice depends not only on what
328
people do, but also on the significance of those actions.” The search for
significance—or meaning—in international law and elsewhere requires a great
deal of attunedness to the variety of backgrounds and goings-on that one
encounters in a given research setting, and an ability to notice the little things
within it (to the extent that they are relevant for making sense of the practice
under investigation). This methodological advice runs counter to positivist
approaches to international law where parsimony, not texture, is valued above
all else. And yet I agree with Nicolini who believes that “good social science
makes the world more complex, not simpler. Thicker, not thinner, descriptions
are the aim of good social science. And so it should be in the attempt to
329
understand practices.” Drawing on the philosopher of science Isabelle
Stengers, Nicolini further claims that “Good science, no matter from which
discipline, enriches the ingredients that make up the multi-faceted universe in
which we live and makes us more articulate and capable of perceiving
330
differences (and thus meaning).”
But what, exactly, do I mean by “meaning”? By saying that practices are
inherently meaningful, practice theorists express that the patterned activity
comprising practices stands in relation to both subjective beliefs and cultural
assumptions about the nature of social life. The idea, coming out of the
philosophical tradition of naturalism, is that social behavior is not linear, but
constantly constructed and reconstructed by individuals in response to the
interpretations of the situations in which they find themselves. To the extent
that we believe this to be the case—and that we are skeptical of the alternative
view that the world is wholly explicable in objective terms alone—it is
incumbent on us to figure out exactly what it is that moves particular
individuals in international legal settings to act, knowingly or otherwise, in the
diverse manners that they do, and why they consider their behavior(s)
appropriate in terms of their subjective beliefs and cultural assumptions. As the
philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright observed more than three decades ago,

326. Barnes, supra note 110, at 22.
327. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 218; see generally BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA, NARRATING THE
ORGANIZATION: DRAMAS OF INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (1997) (arguing that literary devices can help
to reveal deeper organizational realities).
328. Stern, supra note 34, at 186.
329. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 215.
330. Id. at 216.
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“The social scientist must understand the ‘meaning’ of the behavioral data
which he registers in order to turn them into social facts. He achieves this
understanding by describing (interpreting) the data in terms of the concepts and
331
rules which determine the ‘social reality’ of the agents whom he studies.”
Most crucially, insisted von Wright,
The description, and explanation, of social behavior must employ the same conceptual
framework as the social agents themselves. For this reason the social scientist cannot
remain an outsider in relation to his object of study in the same sense in which a
natural scientist can. This is the core conceptual truth, one could say, in the
psychologist’s doctrine of “empathy.” Empathetic
understanding is not a “feeling”; it
332
is an ability to participate in a “form of life.”

It was precisely this ability that Max Weber, at the turn of the twentieth
century, famously associated with the methodological technique of Verstehen,
333
or interpretive understanding.
In our own time, the legal scholar Lawrence Lessig, better known for his
writings on technology, delivered a spirited argument in favor of taking
334
meaning more seriously in legal research. The following, historical illustration
formed part of his argument. Though unrelated to international law, it is worth
repeating verbatim because it nicely illustrates the analytical merit of
ideographic reasoning relative to nomothetic reasoning:
In 1856, Preston Brooks caned Charles Sumner on the floor of the U.S. Senate. [A
rationalist explanation] might speak of the costs this caning created. There is a fairly
solid anti-battering norm in most civilized societies. Sumner suffered the costs of being
battered; Brooks suffered the costs of being a batterer. [A rationalist explanation]
might calibrate the harm to Sumner according to the harm that any victim of a
mugging might suffer.
But the costs of this action—raising a cane and battering another with it—have only a
slight relation to the costs of a mugging. What was significant in the caning was not the
deviation from a norm against battery. Its significance was its meaning. Caning was
how a master treated a slave; it expressed the presumption that the social status of the
victim was below the social status of the attacker. Caning expressed something by the
very choice of weapons used, in the same way that a challenge to a duel would have. A
challenge to duel would have meant that the challenger considered the challenged
either his equal or his superior. The challenge to duel would have expressed this
respect. Depending upon the balance of the social context, it is plausible that the
victim of a caning is worse off than the wounded victim of a duel: the victim of a duel
suffers only the risk of corporal injury, whereas the victim of a caning suffers certain
social injury as well. [A purely rationalist explanation] misses this distinction. The
price of caning is a function of the action and the contextual understandings behind it.
[A rationalist explanation] focuses on the action and ignores the context. Meaning talk
focuses on both. [A rationalist explanation] speaks of the price of behaviors; meaning
talk speaks of prices in particular contexts. [A rationalist explanation] abstracts;

331. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 28 (1971).
332. Id. at 28–29.
333. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 4–22
(Univ. of Cal. 1978) (1922). For the best discussion by far, see FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER’S
METHODOLOGY: THE UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (1997).
334. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181
(1996).
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335

This insight is hardly revolutionary; anthropologists have founded an entire
discipline on its back. And yet, the number of scholars who have embarked on
336
quests for meaning in international law remains regrettably small. One
methodological technique of many that is available to the researcher of
practices in international law seeking to reveal meaning is that of
337
“shadowing:”
By following practitioners, researchers can . . . attain an insider’s view of the patterns
of relationship[s], the different perspectives among co-participants—who is who and
who knows what—the interests at stake, and how these different perspectives, usually
sustained by specific discourses, are worked together, aligned, or played against each
other, so creating differential power positions in the field. By the same token,
researchers can also identify who occupies the different positions made available
by
338
the activity, and appreciate the expectations and privileges that come with them.

Needless to say, the technique of shadowing is not only suitable for the
excavation of meanings but for enacting some of the other methodological
guidelines as well.
E. Investigate Context
The methodological requirement of contextual research on international
law is designed to home in on the centrality of the particular. For Flyvbjerg and
others convinced that practice-based reasoning is the way forward for both
academic and applied scholarship,
[w]hat has been called the “primacy of context” follows from the empirical fact that in
the history of science, human action has shown itself to be irreducible to predefined
elements and rules unconnected to interpretation. Therefore, it has been impossible to
derive praxis from first principles and theory. Praxis has always been contingent on
339
context-dependent judgment, on situational ethics.”

This is so, they say, because it is “the small, local context, which gives
340
phenomena their immediate meaning.” And the search for meaning, as we
have seen, is an important element in the ontology of practices in international
law. At the same time, as Neumann noted, every theory of practice under the
sun has been plagued by the methodological challenge “of how to establish the
341
validity of its findings, of how to generalise.”
335. Id. at 2183.
336. For an overview of this fledgling literature, see Richard Ashby Wilson, Tyrannosaurus Lex:
The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 342 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry
eds., 2007).
337. BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA, SHADOWING AND OTHER TECHNIQUES FOR DOING FIELDWORK
IN MODERN SOCIETIES (2007) (discussing and illustrating an array of ethnographic techniques for
studying people on the move). Other techniques can be consulted in leading anthropology textbooks,
especially those dedicated specifically to ethnography. A good starting point is MARTYN
HAMMERSLEY & PAUL ATKINSON, ETHNOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE (3d ed. 2007).
338. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 222.
339. FLYVBJERG, supra note 126, at 136.
340. Id.
341. Neumann, Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn, supra note 198, at 633.
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My requirement of contextual analysis implies a deliberate eschewing of
generalization about the practice of international law. With this guideline, I do
not mean to disparage the indispensable quest for general statements about
how international law works. Nor do I believe that insights derived with the
help of practice-oriented reasoning are inherently incapable of being scaled up
to the level of statistical analysis, and thus to nomothetic reasoning in search of
covering law-style statements about what Barbara Koremenos recently called
342
“the continent of international law.” My point is a different one: By
sidestepping the immediate (as opposed to long-term) preoccupation with
generalization, scholars of international legal practices have a chance of
becoming more attuned to noticing, and to registering, what is right in front of
them without feeling the need to justify that what they are doing is intellectually
worthwhile in any larger scheme of things, which nowadays increasingly means
saying something of supposedly universal application. To give an example, if a
scholar were to study, from the vantage point of practice theory, the choices
justices make in an international adjudicative setting, such as the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), she would be best served to concentrate fully
on the doings and sayings of the individuals and groups in Strasbourg who are
living and breathing the life of international human-rights law than to abstract
from these local lives of international law in search of more universal patterns
of international adjudication. The latter quest is honorable and important and
has found many adherents, especially in the last fifteen or so years. At the same
time, it glosses over, by necessity, the inner workings of, in our example, the
ECHR. Arguably, an in-depth and closely observed study of the everyday legal
practices of even a subset of the forty-seven judges of the ECHR chambers
(and their legal teams) would be no less, and possibly even more, illuminating
than a coarse-grained study of international legal action that treats international
courts and tribunals as virtually indistinguishable unitary actors.
Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating for a return in the study of
international law to descriptive accounts without theoretical reflection. Quite
the contrary. Consider, by way of analogy, the question of power and its study
in the international system. “The main question,” submits Flyvbjerg, “is not
only the Weberian: ‘Who governs?’ posed by Robert Dahl and most other
students of power. It is also the Nietzschean question: What ‘governmental
343
rationalities’ are at work when those who govern govern?” On this more
complicated understanding of power, which in its contemporary variant owes to
the pioneering work of Foucault, power is thought of as
a dense net of omnipresent relations and not only as localized in ‘centers’ and
institutions, or as an entity one can “possess.” . . . Knowledge and power, truth and
power, rationality and power are analytically inseparable from each other; power
produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power. . . . The central question is how
power is exercised, and not only who has power, and why they have it; the focus in on
342. Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law, 57 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 653, 655
(2013).
343. FLYVBJERG, supra note 126, at 131.
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Applied to the study of international law, such an analytical perspective
demands nothing less than what we might call an archeology of power, by which
I mean a specific and comprehensive account of all rules, norms, and processes
that govern relations between and among those agents affected—as subjects,
objects, or intermediaries—by the practice in the setting under investigation.
Accounts can be considered specific to the extent that they avoid generalizing
descriptions of power dynamics and focus on, say a particular chamber of
judges during a specified and delimited period of time. Accounts will be
comprehensive to the extent that they do not merely describe the visible
distribution of power, but dig up the entire field of power in the context
selected for analysis, thus also excavating hidden or otherwise concealed forms
of domination. It is this kind of analytical commitment to the interpretive study
of international law, exemplified in the context of a study of power, that my
fifth methodological guideline captures and seeks to inspire.
Ultimately, to sum up this discussion of methodological guidelines, the study
of practices in international law necessitates a combination of “zooming in” and
“zooming out.” That is, a practice-oriented approach to the study of
international law
requires first that we zoom in on the details of the accomplishment of a practice in a
specific place to make sense of the local accomplishment of the practice and the other
more or less distant activities. This is followed by, and alternated with, a zooming out
movement through which we expand the scope of the observation following the trails
of connections between practices and their products. The iterative zooming in and out
stops when we can provide a convincing and defensible account of both the practice
and its effects on the dynamics of organizing, showing how that which is local . . .
contributes to the generation of broader effects . . . . Because the zooming in and out
is achieved by switching theoretical lenses, the result is both a representation of
practice and an exercise of diffraction whereby understanding is enriched through
345
reading the results of one form of theorization through another.

VII
CONCLUSION
By relating theory to the practice of international law, I have sought to
make a contribution to the study of international courts and tribunals in
general, and to the study of the ICC in particular. The quest is part and parcel
of what Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg recently termed “the empirical
346
turn in international legal scholarship.” Although not widely pursued in the
study of international law, practice theory, in all of its guises, offers numerous
analytical entry points for making sense of international legal phenomena.
Indeed the sociologists Charles Samic, Neil Gross, and Michèle Lamont
recently argued that practice-oriented reasoning is amenable to answering
344. Id. at 131–32.
345. NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 219.
346. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012).
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different typ
pes of questions about so
ocial life, theereby illustraating the app
proach’s
broad analytical utility:
[S]ubjectting practices to
o analysis open
ns up the “blacck box” of sociaal life: the intriicate
web of situated
s
human
n experience which
w
tradition
nal conceptionss of human action,
social strructure, and cu
ulture all elided
d. For some sch
holars, this mo
ove is motivated by
explanato
ory questions, that is, by an interest in locatin
ng within practtices the underllying
causal prrocesses or me
echanisms by which
w
certain ssocial factors trranslate (or faail to
translate)) into variouss downstream consequencess, as well as in identifying the
upstream
m sources of th
hose processes. For other sch
holars, interprettive questions h
have
primacy, and compreh
hending agentss’ practices is essential for understanding the
at they attach to what they ssay and do. Fo
or still other so
ocial
subjective meanings tha
scientistss and humanistts, practices arre compelling o
objects of inveestigation on m
more
intrinsic grounds; by examining
e
them
m, researcherss can either d
discover otherw
wisearities or (acco
ording to an in
nverse rationalle) deconstructt the
concealed social regula
very nottion of such regularities.
r
Eiither way, sch
holars continuee, analyzing so
ocial
practices reinserts huma
an conduct into
o its specific hiistorical contextts and preservees its
mensionality, thu
us not only cha
allenging univeersalizing claim
ms about the naature
multidim
of action
n but encouragin
ng critical refleexivity about thiis constitutive aspect of the so
ocial
world on
n the part of re
esearchers study
ying347social praactices—and, byy extension, on
n the
part of ag
gents engaging in those practicces.

Furtherm
more, the ontology of
o practicess uniquely squares an
nalytical
emphases on
o agents, structure, materiality,
m
aand meanin
ng in the sstudy of
internationa
al law. This relationship
r
is
i illustrated in figure 2.
Figure
F
2: The Ontology of
o Practices iin Internatio
onal Law

Source: Adapte
ed from Adller & Pouliott, supra notee 104, at 22.
347. Camic,, Gross, & Lamo
ont, supra note 320,
3 at 8.
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Although different theories of practice manage the interrelationships among
these emphases differently—and thus would be located in different quadrants in
figure 2—all can be made eminently usable for capturing the social lives of
international law. This is so because
a practice-oriented framework can accommodate a variety of theories and paradigms
in offering a large menu for choice: (1) whether to concentrate on the material or
symbolic dimensions of practice, or both; (2) whether to focus on the structural or
agential nature of practice, or both; (3) whether to look into the stabilizing or dynamic
aspects of practice, or both; (4) whether to treat practice as explanandum or
explanans, or both; (5) if explanandum, what other factors (whatever their ontological
status) to conjure in explaining the lifecycle of practice; (6) if explanans, what other
determinants to add on to practices themselves in explaining transformation; (7) if
explanans, what type of interplay of practices is generating transformations;348and (8) if
explanans, what transformation the ordinary unfolding of practice produces.

However, because the study of practices in international law is still a very
new proposition, a great deal of translational research is required, especially
because practice theorists in the humanities and social sciences have not, as we
have seen, been overly keen to delve into the weeds of empirical life. As one
scholar observes, “In spite of building on the shoulders of giants, practice
theory is still in its infancy and whether it will ever become a powerful
bandwagon is yet to be determined. Most importantly, the practice approach is
349
still largely untested.” Among the major theorists, Bourdieu has arguably
come closest to linking close observations of the everyday to theoretical
reflection, and yet even his accounts have been subjected to endless criticism,
notably on methodological grounds. Consequently, “the proof of the [analytical
power of the] approach will be in the capacity of future texts to represent
practice,” in the domain of international law and elsewhere, “in a rich and
insightful way. Therefore, the way forward is, first and foremost, to develop the
350
approach by using it.” I and the other contributors to this issue of Law and
Contemporary Problems have sought to do just that.
Yet some scholars circumspect about the promise of practice-oriented
research designs in the study of the international system have cautioned that
“most of us, young and old, lack experience of the big issues of international
351
political life.” If we believe the cautioner, the IR scholar Chris Brown,
[t]his is a problem for proponents of the ‘practice turn’ as much as for those who rely
on practical wisdom. Both the ‘practice turn’ and the idea of practical reason rest on
notions of knowing how to go on in the world, and whether this ability is seen as
resting on acquired dispositions or the ability to reason from experience, it cannot be
352
learnt only from books.

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Adler & Pouliot, supra note 104, at 21.
NICOLINI, supra note 43, at 240.
Id.
Brown, supra note 127, at 455.
Id.
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It goes without saying that book knowledge is insufficient for generating
knowledge about the power of practices in the international system. Even so, I
am not convinced that experience is quite as difficult to come by as Brown
suggests. I propose that the supposed problem is more imagined than real. It
certainly is a problem for those metatheoretical IL and IR scholars whose
research is rooted in deskwork rather than fieldwork. It is considerably less
problematic a proposition for anyone steeped in qualitative methods, from
archival to observational research. In other words, the ostensible problem is
methodological in nature, not epistemological. This being so, it can be
addressed, if not entirely solved, with recourse to the methodology of the social
sciences, especially the increasingly sophisticated literature on small-n
353
research.
Put differently, practices can be made known. Scores of textbooks in
354
anthropology have addressed the perennial challenge of “access.” It also bears
emphasizing that many a setting outside of the field of IR is considerably more
challenging—not to mention dangerous—than working for extended periods of
time alongside diplomats and otherwise distinguished professionals in the world
of international law. This is not to say that Brown does not have a point. He is
correct to argue that access to “high level” practices is usually prohibitive.
However, an abundance of practical knowledge is located well below the higher
echelons of international politics. The same applies to the world of international
law. In fact, often much more useful knowledge is to be collected where power
does not formally reside, or at least not in its most concentrated form.
As a matter of fact, the imagined problem only becomes real if the
disciplines and subfields directed toward the study of international law—chiefly
IL and IR—are content with the very limited methodological training they
provide and the disregard for rigorous and in-depth field research they
generally espouse. It is unheard of in other disciplines (for example,
anthropology) and subfields (for example, comparative politics) to throw up
one’s hands simply because access to potential evidence is difficult.
Anthropologists do not shy away from difficult settings and often devote years
to immersing themselves in previously alien or otherwise unfamiliar research
sites. In anthropology, at least in its cultural variant, immersion continues to be
a sine qua non of doctoral training. Historians dig deep into archives, almost
always acquiring over the course of several years language and other skills
necessary for deciphering human artifacts that they did not theretofore possess.
It stands to reason that IL and IR scholars—and anyone else interested in
“reading” international law in this sense—can be taught to do the same.

353. See, e.g., JOHN GERRING, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (2006).
354. See, e.g., GAINING ACCESS: A PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL GUIDE FOR QUALITATIVE
RESEARCHERS (Martha S. Feldman, Jeannine Bell & Michele Tracy Berger eds., 2003); HAMMERSLEY
& ATKINSON, supra note 337, at 41–62; see also David Buchanan, David Boddy & James McCalman,
Getting In, Getting On, Getting Out and Getting Back, in DOING RESEARCH IN ORGANISATIONS 53–67
(Alan Bryman ed., 1988).

1 MEIRHENRICH (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 3 & 4 2013]

3/19/2014 11:29 AM

THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

83

By making a case for a practice-based approach to the empirical analysis of
the ICC, I have sought to lay some of the theoretical and methodological
groundwork for more ideographic research on the determinants of international
law, by which I mean scholarship that is more rigorously descriptive of what
Karl Llewellyn called the “law-crafts” than we have been accustomed to. By
complementing the increasingly nomothetic study of international law with
ideographic ways of seeing the everyday life of international lawyers, we stand
to gain a richer, more realistic understanding of how international law works.

